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A child is born in the United States (“U.S.”) to a recently wed U.S. 
citizen father and Japanese mother. The parents live happily for several 
years, but begin to experience irreconcilable differences in their marriage 
and ultimately seek a divorce. In the dissolution proceedings, the judge 
orders joint custody of the child. A few years later, to the father’s dismay, 
he receives an international phone call from the mother informing him 
that her “visit” to Japan with the child would be perpetual and that she 
does not intend to return to the U.S. with the child. The mother 
subsequently appears before a Japanese court, where she obtains an order 
granting her sole custody. Although the father has a conflicting American 
court order assigning him valid custody rights, that order is not recognized 
by the Japanese judge. Just like that, the father’s life has taken a turn for 
the worst as he realizes that his child is six-thousand miles away and there 
may be nothing he can do about it. 
Meanwhile, in Japan, hope is on the horizon for a new family as a 
Japanese man and an American woman get married and welcome a child 
of their own. Unfortunately, after several years, the marriage begins to 
crumble. When divorce proceedings are initiated, the mother and father 
decide to keep the custody issue out of court because they are aware of 
Japanese courts’ tendency to designate sole custody to one parent. They 
do not wish to risk uncertainty regarding who will receive legal custody 
of the child. Instead, the parents make an agreement to share decision-
making authority with regard to the child. As it turns out, the mother had 
secretly intended all along to take the child back to the U.S. and create a 
permanent home there. Upon the mother’s petition, an American court 
grants her sole custody of the child without any consideration of the 
potential rights of the father in Japan. The father soon realizes that his 
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child may be gone forever. As he gazes into the night sky, he wonders 
helplessly what his child is doing at that exact moment. Meanwhile, six-
thousand miles away, another left-behind father solemnly watches the 
sunrise, contemplating the same of his own child. In the end, international 
parental child abduction shattered not one, but two, parental bonds, 
leaving a pair of broken hearts and empty souls on opposite ends of the 
world. 
The above example illustrates the importance of a major goal in the 
realm of international child abduction: to prevent parents from taking their 
children across national borders to seek favorable custody rulings from 
sympathetic courts that are not obliged to consider the conflicting rights 
of left-behind parents. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction (“the Convention”) is a multilateral treaty 
that was enacted to achieve that purpose. However, as discussed below, 
the Convention has its shortcomings and the need for a more equitable 
consideration of the interests of children remains. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The Convention concluded on October 25, 1980.1 As of September 
2014, ninety-three countries are Members of the Convention,2 which 
recognizes that in custody arrangements, the children’s interests are of 
utmost importance.3 As such, the Convention has two explicit aims: “(a) 
to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in 
any Contracting State; and (b) to ensure that rights of custody and access 
 
 1.  Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98 (entered into force Dec. 1, 1983) [hereinafter 
Convention]. The Convention is a non-self-executing treaty, meaning that domestic 
legislation is required to implement it into force in a State’s domestic law. D. MARIANNE 
BLAIR, et. al, FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW 432 (2d ed. 2009). 
 2.  HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, STATUS TABLE UNDER THE 
CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD 
ABDUCTION, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 [hereinafter 
STATUS TABLE]. Each country became a Member of the Convention either by ratification, 
accession, or succession, and subsequently entered it into force. Id. In China, however, the 
Convention applies only in Hong Kong and Macao. Id. (follow the “View and/or print full 
status report” hyperlink; then follow the letter “C” hyperlink next to the “People’s Republic of 
China.”)  
 3.  The opening sentence of the Convention provides: “The States signatory to the 
present Convention, Firmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount 
importance in matters relating to their custody. . .” Convention, supra note 1. 
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under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the 
other Contracting States.”4 Removal or retention of a child is “wrongful” 
where it amounts to a “breach of rights of custody” belonging to someone 
“under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident5 
immediately before the removal or retention,” where those custody rights 
were in fact exercised, or would have been exercised, but for the child’s 
removal or retention.6 
Although the goals of the Convention are seemingly straightforward, 
achieving them in practice is more problematic, particularly in light of the 
Article 12 and Article 13 exceptions to the general rule requiring the 
prompt return of a child to his or her State of habitual residence.7 Article 
12 requires the return of a wrongfully removed or retained child where 
judicial or administrative proceedings commence within one year after the 
date on which the child was removed or retained.8 If more than one year 
passes before the commencement of such proceedings, the return of the 
child is likewise required, “unless it is demonstrated that the child is now 
settled in its new environment.”9 Notwithstanding the specifications of 
Article 12, Article 13(b) states that the return of the child is not required 
if one who opposes the child’s return affirmatively shows that “there is a 
grave risk that [the] return would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation.”10 
Several provisions of the Convention provide that judicial  and 
administrative authorities are not to equate their decisions under the 
 
 4.  Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1. 
 5.  Id. The Convention does not define “habitual residence,” as the term is meant 
to be fluid. Id. In the U.S., the “habitual residence” is presumed to be the particular State 
where the child lived prior to being abducted. Julia A. Todd, The Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Are the Convention’s Goals Being 
Achieved?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 553, 558 (1994). Courts have split on the issue 
of whether “habitual residence” is properly determined by the subjective intentions of the 
parties or objective indicators (e.g., the child’s adaption to the new environment). Tai 
Vivatvaraphol, Back To Basics: Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence  in 
International Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3325, 3325 (2009). 
 6.  Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3. Article III of the Convention also states that 
rights of custody may arise either by operation of law, judicial or administrative order, or 
the existence of an agreement having legal effect under the laws of the State of habitual 
residence. Id. 
 7.  Id. at arts. 12−13. 
 8.  Id. at art. 12. 
 9.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 10.  Id. at art. 13(b) (emphasis added). Also, Article 20 codifies a rarely invoked, 
but potentially significant exception, providing that a child need not be returned if “the 
fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protecting of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms” would not allow for the return. Id. at art. 20. 
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Convention with the merits of the underlying custody arrangement.11 
American courts have interpreted that language to imply that the courts of 
an abducted-to nation lack jurisdiction to decide the merits of underlying 
custody disputes; instead, custody determinations are properly left to the 
courts of the country of “habitual residence.”12 One rationale for that 
interpretation is that preserving the status quo of prior custody arrangements 
will deter parents from removing children across international borders to 
seek more sympathetic courts.13 This principle is consistent with the spirit 
of the Convention.14 
II.  THE UNITED STATES VERSUS JAPAN AS MEMBER STATES                    
TO THE CONVENTION 
The U.S. ratified the Convention on July 1, 1988.15 To implement the 
Convention into domestic law, the U.S. enacted the International Child 
Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”).16 The U.S. government then 
promulgated rules to help implement ICARA.17 Pursuant to ICARA, 
Convention actions may be heard in either state or federal courts.18 The 
requisite burden of proof for a successful Article 13(b) defense is “clear 
and convincing evidence,” whereas other exceptions enumerated in 
Article 12 or Article 13 only require a “preponderance of the evidence.”19 
 
 11.  These provisions include Articles 16, 17, and 19. For instance, Article 19 states, 
“a decision under this Convention concerning the return of a child shall not be taken to be 
a determination on the merits of any custody issue.” Id. at art. 19; see also id. at arts. 
16−17. 
 12.  See, e.g., Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063−64 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 13.  Id. at 1064. 
 14.  See generally Convention, supra note 1 (expressing the desire to prevent the 
wrongful removal or retention of children internationally on the assumption that such removal 
or retention would harmfully impact them). 
 15.  STATUS TABLE, supra note 2. 
 16.  International Child Abduction Remedies Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (2012) 
[hereinafter ICARA]. 
 17.  HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, U.S. COUNTRY PROFILE UNDER 
THE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD 
ABDUCTION, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/abduct2012cp_us.pdf [hereinafter 
U.S. COUNTRY PROFILE]. The rules are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. See 
22 C.F.R. §§ 94.1−94.8 (2014). 
 18.  Michael R. Walsh & Susan W. Savard, International Child Abduction & the 
Hague Convention, 6 BARRY L. REV. 29, 49−50 (2006). 
 19.  Id. Proving the Article 20 “human rights and fundamental freedoms” exception 
requires “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. 
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Subsequently, most American states adopted the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”).20 Consistent with the 
international Convention, the UCCJEA allows for the “recognition and 
enforcement” of foreign child custody and visitation orders.21 The UCCJEA 
serves to ensure that prior custody determinations complied with due 
process and equal protection principles.22 
After the Convention entered into force in the U.S., the U.S. State 
Department began issuing annual reports indicating which Member States 
were non-compliant in returning children there pursuant to the Convention.23 
For example, the most recent report, issued in April 2014, indicated that 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras were “not compliant.”24 Additionally, 
the Bahamas and Brazil were labeled as having demonstrated “patterns of 
non-compliance.”25 
One country that some suspect might exhibit similar patterns of non-
compliance, now that it has ratified the Convention, is Japan.26 On May 
 
 20.  See U.S. COUNTRY PROFILE, supra note 17; Unif. Child Custody and 
Enforcement Act 9(1A) U.L.A. 657 (1997), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/ 
docs/child_custody_jurisdiction/uccjea_final_97.pdf. 
 21.  According to the U.S., “In general, the [UCCJEA] provides a mechanism for 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign custody orders by U.S. state courts, if the 
foreign proceeding was done in substantial conformity with the provisions of the UCCJEA 
governing due process. Additionally, within the United States, each U.S. state must give 
full faith and credit to a civil protection order granted by another U.S. state. Thus, we believe 
the current trend in the United States is for courts to recognize foreign orders of protection or, 
where the order cannot be recognized directly, create a mirror order.” U.S. COUNTRY PROFILE, 
supra note 17. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: BUREAU OF CONSULATE AFFAIRS, COMPLIANCE 
INFORMATION, http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/legal/compliance.html, 
for a collection of the reports. Mexico has been labeled as non-compliant or displaying 
patterns of non-compliance every year since 1999. Id. One country that has also been 
particularly problematic is Brazil, as evidenced by the 2008−2013 reports, all indicating 
that Brazil either demonstrated patterns of non-compliance or was non-compliant. Id. The 
U.S. had returned seven abducted children to Brazil pursuant to the Convention by 2010, 
but Brazil did not send a single child back to the U.S. in a Convention proceeding until the 
infamous case of a child named Sean Goldman in 2009, where international pressure and 
threatened economic sanctions may have been the true cause of the decision. See Amanda 
Michelle Waide, To Comply or Not to Comply? Brazil’s Relationship with the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 271, 295 (2010). 
 24.  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: BUREAU OF CONSULATE AFFAIRS, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 
(2014), http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2014.pdf 
[hereinafter 2014 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE]. 
 25.  Id. The reasons for these particular States’ non-compliance will be discussed 
below in further detail. 
 26.  See Colin P.A. Jones, Hague Convention on Child Abduction May Shape Japan’s 
Family Law, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 11, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/ 
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22, 2013, Japan solidified its intention to become a member to the 
Convention by statutorily joining the treaty.27 Japan enacted the necessary 
legislation to implement the Convention into domestic law on June 12, 
2013.28 The Japanese government approved the promulgation of the 
Convention on January 24, 2014, which then entered into force on April 
1, 2014.29 Japan’s initial hesitation to becoming a signatory to the 
Convention is partially rooted in its domestic family law system, which is 
inconsistent with the goals and principles underlying the Convention.30 
Another related factor is its claim that it needs to protect Japanese mothers 
fleeing from domestic violence.31 These and other reasons, to be discussed 
in further detail below, raise suspicion that Japanese courts may not fully 
comply with the Convention or might inaccurately interpret its exceptions. 
III.  THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALISTIC BIAS AND STRATEGIC 
INTERPRETATION 
The U.S. is a relatively old member of the Convention and frequently 
upholds the treaty’s core principles by narrowly interpreting its exceptions.32 
Contrarily, Japan is the newest signatory to the Convention and has 
already provided several reasons to give other Member States concern 
over its bona fide compliance.33  The basic problem is that the vague 
language of the Article 12 and Article 13 exceptions allows Member States 
to interject subjective bias into the enforcement process and evade the 
Convention’s principles, rendering the treaty’s application inconsistent. 
Although the U.S. often upholds the principles of the Convention by 




 27.  Overview of the Hague Convention and Related Japanese Legal Systems, 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (June 2, 2014), http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/hr 
_ha/page22e_000250.html. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See Megan J. Reynolds, It Can Be Done: On Japan Becoming a Successful 
Signatory to the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 44 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 367, 379−81 (2012). 
 31.  Id. at 386−87. 
 32.  See, e.g., Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069; Renovales v. Roosa, No. FA 91 0392232 
S, 1991 WL 204483, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1991); Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 
204, 218 (1st Cir. 2000); McManus v. McManus, 354 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 33.  See Jones, supra note 26. 
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engaged in liberal interpretations of the Article 12 and 13 exceptions and, 
at times, interjected nationalistic bias into the process.34 The risk of 
subjective interpretation is particularly great with regard to the Article 
13(b) defense, which is problematic because such defenses have been on 
the rise globally and have remained the most common reason for a court 
to refuse a child’s return.35 
As for Japan, its domestic family law system seems to conflict with the 
Convention’s principles. For instance, its failure to recognize joint 
custody36 may often hinder, rather than further, the interests of children. 
Moreover, its bias in favor of preserving maternal custody and Japanese 
heritage37 may influence courts to avoid prompt return in many situations. 
Japan’s hesitance to ratify the Convention and its willingness to act as a 
safe haven for Japanese mothers38 also suggest that Japan may apply the 
exceptions in an overly broad manner and, consequently, may not honor 
foreign court judgments to compel child removal. 
This problem of interpretation and judicial bias towards one’s own 
country is not easily solved. Several possible solutions exist, such as 
amending the Convention to narrow the language of the exceptions, 
providing effective economic sanctions against non-compliant Member 
States, or simply resorting to regional agreements rather than international 
ones. However, current signatories would likely resist narrowing the 
language of the exceptions; the current broad language is favored 
because it provides a measure of discretion that expands the range of 
justifications available to courts in denying a child’s return.39 As to 
 
 34.  See, e.g., Krishna v. Krishna, No. C 97-0021 SC, 1997 WL 195439, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 11, 1997) (“It is clear from the evidence that the relationship between Mr. and 
Ms. Krishna is a tempestuous one, which has caused considerable psychological stress to 
both parents and child. Return of the child to Australia would only serve to reinstate the 
child in a highly stressful and psychologically damaging environment, particularly 
because Ms. Krishna has relatively limited familial support in Australia. Moreover, the 
child is currently well settled in United States where a divorce proceeding has been filed 
and can been expedited to minimize the costs to Mr. Krishna”). 
 35.  NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, LITIGATING INT’L CHILD 
ABDUCTION CASES UNDER THE CONVENTION 53 (2012) [hereinafter LITIGATING INT’L 
CHILD ABDUCTION CASES]; HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS OF APPLICATIONS MADE IN 2008 UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 
OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: PART I – 
GLOBAL REPORT ¶¶ 107-109 (2011), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/ 
abduct2011pd08ae.pdf. 
 36.  Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380−81; Jennifer Costa, If Japan Signs the Hague 
Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Real Change or Political 
Maneuvering?, 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 369, 376 (2010). 
 37.  Reynolds, supra note 30, at 382−84. 
 38.  See id. at 386−87; Costa, supra note 36, at 371. 
 39.  Consider that, in 2013, return was denied in fifty-seven Convention proceedings 
worldwide, while return was ordered in one-hundred-four such proceedings. U.S. DEP’T 
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sanctions, they tend to create hostility and may not address the problem 
on a global level.40 In light of these considerations, the most effective and 
enduring solution is a system where some degree of neutrality can be 
achieved internationally and where all affected parties have the opportunity 
to participate in structuring the result that will legally bind them in the 
future. 
A.  The Problem of Exception Over-Breadth 
1.  U.S. Judicial Interpretation of the Article 13(b) 
The American interpretation of Convention Article 13(b) is not easily 
ascertainable because U.S. courts have applied a wide variety of approaches 
in different circumstances.41 Overall, however, U.S. courts have most 
often applied the exception narrowly.42 For instance, in the frequently 
cited case of Friedrich v. Friedrich, the Sixth Circuit held that the Article 
13(b) “grave risk of harm” exception does not allow courts in the country 
to which the child was taken to engage in speculation on where the “child 
would be happiest.”43 Rather, the exception can be properly applied only 
in two situations: (1) where the child is at risk of imminent danger if 
returned (meaning the child will be returned to circumstances of famine, 
disease, or war); or (2) where “serious neglect, abuse, or extreme emotional 
dependence” of the child is implicated if returned.44 In either scenario, for 
the defense to be properly invoked, the courts in the State of habitual 
residence must also be unable or unwilling to adequately protect the 
child.45 A circuit split exists among U.S. federal courts as to whether the 
 
OF STATE: BUREAU OF CONSULATE AFFAIRS, OUTGOING AND INCOMING CASE CLOSINGS 
STATISTICS (2013), available at http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/statistics/ 
CY2013%20-%20Incoming%20and%20Outgoing%20Closing%20Statistics.pdf. Although 
the Convention seems to be working more often than not, these statistics tend to show that 
Member States are still denying return fairly often in cases in which they are supposedly 
applying the Convention. See id. 
 40.  For instance, economic sanctions may adversely affect vulnerable populations, 
such as in third world countries. This may spark humanitarian concerns among 
the international community. See UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/sc/committees. 
 41.  Compare Freidrich, 78 F.3d at 1069, with Krishna, 1997 WL 195439, at *4. 
 42.  See Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069; Roosa, 1991 WL 204483, at *6; Walsh, 221 
F.3d at 218; McManus, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 69. 
 43.  Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1068. 
 44.  Id. at 1069. 
 45.  See id. 
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Article 13(b) requires imminent danger or, alternatively, whether how far in 
the future the alleged harm would occur is irrelevant.46 
If the court in the country that the child is being returned to—the State 
of habitual residence—can adequately remedy the situation, then the 
Article 13(b) exception generally does not apply.47 Nonetheless, in 2008, 
the Eleventh Circuit determined that an analysis of whether the State of 
habitual residence can provide adequate protection is problematic.48 The 
court ultimately held that the responding party had no duty to show the 
inability or unwillingness of the country of habitual residence to adequately 
protect the child in order to establish that a “grave risk of harm” would 
result upon the child’s return.49 
American courts generally refuse to grant exceptions to the Convention as 
substitutes for the perceived best interests of the child.50 For instance, in 
Renovales v. Roosa, a mother took her children from their habitual 
residence in Spain to Connecticut, breaching the father’s custody rights, 
in violation of the Convention.51 The mother invoked the Article 13(b) 
“grave risk of harm” defense, alleging that one of the children suffered 
from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) at least partially due to the 
father’s controlling and hostile behavior, including force-feeding, screaming 
at, and humiliating the child.52 The Connecticut Superior Court refused to 
apply the exception, finding evidence of nothing more than “cultural 
differences in family child rearing.”53 Consequently, the court ordered that 
the child be immediately returned to Spain and held the mother liable for 
both travel expenses and attorney’s fees.54 
However, U.S. courts have refused to return a child pursuant to the 
Convention in cases where there is concrete evidence of past physical 
abuse by the parent to whom the child would be returned.55 For example, 
in Danaipour v. McLarey, the First Circuit refused to send two sisters back 
to their habitual residence in Sweden after the district court found that the 
father sexually abused one of them.56 The court affirmed the district 
court’s conclusion that a finding of sexual abuse of one daughter, 
 
 46.  Compare Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005), with Walsh, 
221 F.3d at 218. 
 47.  See Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069. 
 48.  Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See, e.g., Roosa, 1991 WL 204483, at *5. 
 51.  Id. at *1. 
 52.  Id. at *3−4. 
 53.  Id. at *5. 
 54.  Id. at *6. 
 55.  See, e.g., Danaipour v. McLarey, 386 F.3d 289, 304 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 56.  Id. 
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combined with the resulting psychological harm to both daughters, was 
sufficient to invoke the Article 13(b) defense.57 On the other hand, a 
Massachusetts district court reached the opposite conclusion in McManus v. 
McManus, where a mother seeking return of her children to Northern 
Ireland faced an Article 13(b) defense on account of her harsh physical 
discipline of the children, including striking them at least six times and 
engaging her brother and friend to assist in physically disciplining them 
twice.58 The court admitted that there was reason to believe that the 
children would experience some degree of psychological harm if returned to 
their mother’s care in Northern Ireland and even characterized the harm 
as “serious.”59 However, the court observed that cases successfully invoking 
the Article 13(b) defense in the past required evidence of a continuing 
pattern of physical abuse, a high propensity for violence, or  both.60 
Conversely, “evidence of real but sporadic or isolated incidents of physical 
abuse” had been insufficient to invoke the exception.61 Hence, despite the 
children’s objection to return, the court found the facts insufficient for an 
Article 13(b) defense.62 
A more recent Seventh Circuit decision, Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 
held that the magnitude of the potential harm, and thus an assessment of 
the nature of the harm, is a proper consideration in addition to the mere 
likelihood that the harm will take place if the child is returned.63 That case 
involved two children whose State of habitual residence was Belgium.64 
The mother was living in the U.S. with the two children when the father 
was awarded custody by a Belgian court, thus rendering the mother an 
“abductor.”65 At trial, the mother presented several affidavits alleging that 
the father abused her multiple times per week, including choking her, 
pushing her down the stairs, kicking her at least once while she was 
pregnant, and threatening to kill her and the children.66 The wife also 
alleged that the father had used harsh physical punishment on the daughter 
 
 57.  Id. at 302−03. It appears that sexual abuse is a bright line qualifier for Article 
13(b) refusal of return. See id. 
 58.  McManus, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 65, 70. 
 59.  Id. at 65. 
 60.  Id. at 70. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 64.  Id. at 569. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
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in the past.67 The Seventh Circuit concluded that “given [the father’s] 
propensity for violence, and the grotesque disregard for the children’s 
welfare that he displayed by beating his wife severely and repeatedly in 
their presence and hurling obscene epithets at her also in their presence, it 
would be irresponsible to think the risk to the children less than grave.”68 
The court, noting the sufficiency of the evidence of grave risk of harm and 
the questionable post-return conditions in Belgium, remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing to explore those issues.69 
By the same token, U.S. courts are more reluctant to invoke the Article 
13(b) defense based on physical abuse where there are only bare allegations 
as opposed to concrete evidence.70 For instance, in Munoz v. Ramirez, 
despite the father’s allegations that his daughter was sexually abused by 
her mother’s boyfriend, the court refused to invoke the “grave risk of harm” 
defense because there was “no actual evidence” indicating that the mother’s 
boyfriend had a history of child molestation or that he inappropriately 
touched the daughter.71 
Some courts alternatively considered a series of factors in the physical 
abuse context to determine whether the “grave risk of harm” is sufficient 
to invoke the Article 13(b) defense.72 An illustrative example is Simcox v. 
Simcox, where the court considered the nature of the abuse, the frequency 
with which the abuse occurred, and the probability that it would happen 
again without adequate protection.73 In that case, the mother sought to 
prevent her children’s return to their father in their State  of habitual 
residence, presenting evidence that he repeatedly beat them, hit them with a 
belt, pulled their hair and ears, had angry outbursts, and abused the 
 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 570. 
 69.  Id. at 572. But see Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 719 (7th Cir. 2006) (ordering 
the children’s return to their State of habitual residence in Germany where the father 
abducted the children to the U.S. and displayed a similar pattern of abuse and threats 
toward the mother, but on the sole basis that Germany was the habitual residence rather 
than on Article 13(b) grounds, as the Article 13(b) defense was not raised). 
 70.  Munoz v. Ramirez, 923 F. Supp. 2d 931, 955 (W.D. Tex. 2013); see also Jaet 
v. Siso, No. 08–81232–CIV, 2009 WL 35270, at *7−8 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (holding that 
physically disciplining the child, while concerning, was insufficient to invoke the Article 
13(b) defense because there was no evidence of child abuse beyond that purpose, and the 
discipline could be partially accounted for by cultural differences in child upbringing, a 
matter inappropriate for court interference); Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 
850−51 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to invoke the Article 13(b) exception where the 
mother offered a psychologist’s testimony indicating that the child had PTSD and probably 
suffered from sexual, physical, and emotional abuse as well as child neglect, in the absence 
of evidence that the father actually abused the child). 
 71.  Munoz, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 955. 
 72.  See, e.g., Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 609 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 73.  Id. at 608. 
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mother in their presence.74 Because the nature of the harm was “serious,” 
occurred with “extreme frequency,” and was reasonably likely to happen 
again without protection, the court concluded that the mother established 
her burden of proving a grave risk of harm by clear and convincing 
evidence.75 
It is relatively common for U.S. courts interpreting Article 13(b) of the 
Convention to require proof of specificity.76 For instance, successfully 
opposing a child’s return typically requires showing the specific potential 
harm that will be endured by that child, not someone else.77  However, 
some courts have applied a more liberal standard of proof in determining 
whether the alleged harm would affect a specific child as opposed to a 
parent or someone else.78 For example, in In re Krishna v. Krishna, the 
mother took the child from Australia to the U.S. in violation of the 
Convention.79 She later raised an Article 13(b) defense alleging that the 
father physically abused her, but never the child, in the past.80 The court 
held that the mother could properly invoke the defense because although 
physical harm was unlikely, there was “compelling evidence establishing the 
potential for serious psychological harm” in light of the history of alleged 
abuse and the hostile relationship between the parents.81 
Several past decisions in U.S. courts indicate a willingness to consider 
the fact that a child is settled into his or her new environment in deciding 
whether a “grave risk of harm” is sufficiently grave to deny the return of 
 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 609. 
 76.  See, e.g., Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1067−68. 
 77.  See id. 
 78.  See, e.g., Krishna, 1997 WL 195439, at *4. 
 79.  Id. at *1. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at *1, *4. This liberal standard appears to be out of line with American 
courts’ general approach. See Croll v. Croll, 66 F. Supp. 2d 555, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(“The cases applying the Hague Convention make manifest that the Article 13 exception 
is only applicable when the child, as opposed to a parent, would be placed in danger if she 
were returned”). 
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the child.82 However, mere adjustment problems are generally inadequate.83 
Presumably, then, most American courts in the Article 13(b) context would 
not be swayed by arguments that the child being returned would have to 
bear the burden of attending a new school, meeting new friends, or 
learning a new language.84 
At least one U.S. court has considered the potential effect that separation 
from his or her parent(s) would have on the child.85 However, in light of 
inconsistent precedents, it remains unclear whether a court today would 
consider a strong parent-child bond sufficient to invoke the Article 13(b) 
defense or, alternatively, whether it would leave resolution of the issue to 
the courts of the child’s State of habitual residence.86 While some courts 
have determined that it is appropriate to weigh a child’s objection to being 
returned in evaluating the Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” defense,87 
others have rejected such an approach.88 
 
 82.  See Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 153 (2d Cir. 2001); Tsarbopoulos v. 
Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1059 (E.D. Wash. 2001). Those courts appear to be 
fusing the Article 12 “settled into new environment” exception and the 13(b) “grave risk 
of harm” exception into one. See id. However, there is no indication in the language of the 
Convention that how well a child is settled in his or her new environment (Article 12) has 
anything to do with establishing a “grave risk of harm” for Article 13(b) purposes. See 
Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 12, 13(b). 
 83.  See Morrison v. Dietz, Civil Action No. 07–1398, 2008 WL 4280030, at *13  
(W.D. La. 2008), aff’d on other grounds, 349 F. App’x 930 (5th Cir. 2009); Friedrich, 78 
F.3d at 1068 (“Under the logic of the Convention, it is the abduction that causes the pangs 
of the subsequent return”). 
 84.  The “habitual residence” dynamic should reduce the raising of such arguments 
because children are returned to the State where they originally lived before the abduction. 
However, in some cases, the child may be present in the abducted-to nation for long 
enough to establish a comfortable life there, inclusive of school, friends, and culture. As a 
result, the child may face adaptation-related problems upon return. 
 85.  See Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 1061−62 (refusing to return the children 
to their habitual residence in Greece where the mother was one child’s primary caregiver 
for nearly his entire life, that child had a strong bond with his siblings, and the mother 
could not return to Greece due to inadequate resources). But see Charalambous v. 
Charalambous, 627 F.3d 462, 469−70 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that the effect on the child 
of separation from the mother is an issue properly left to the courts of the State of habitual 
residence); Jaet, 2009 WL 35270, at *8 (holding that although the children were so 
attached to their mother that separation would probably result in severe psychological 
harm, the Article 13(b) defense failed due to the absence of legal authority compelling a 
return under the particular facts of the case). 
 86.  Case law is inconsistent on this issue. Compare Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1061−62, with Charalambous, 627 F.3d at 469−70, and Siso, 2009 WL 35270, at *8. 
 87.  See, e.g., Kofler v. Kofler, Civil No. 07-5040, 2007 WL 2081712, at *8−9 
(W.D. Ark. 2007). 
 88.  See, e.g., Kufner v. Kufner, 480 F. Supp. 2d 491, 512−13 (D.R.I. 2007) (refusing to 
consider children’s inconsistent wishes in assessing “grave risk of harm” because of the 
possibility that their parents unduly influenced them, especially considering the children’s 
youth and immaturity). 
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As for the “grave risk that [the] return would . . . otherwise place the child 
in an intolerable situation,”89  the court in Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch 
concluded that a country’s “civil stability” was insufficient.90 Although 
Argentina, the State of habitual residence in that case, was experiencing 
extremely difficult financial times and government chaos, the court 
determined that the circumstances of return were nonetheless tolerable 
because the neighborhoods and schools surrounding the child’s prospective 
home were not dangerously affected.91 In such situations, where the 
perceived harm is more likely to affect to the general population as opposed 
to a particular child, courts have considered at least three additional factors in 
evaluating whether a “grave risk of harm” exists: (1) whether terrorist 
attacks or other violent activities substantially disrupted life in the State 
of habitual residence;92 (2) whether, prior to the abduction, the child faced 
the harm complained of and the parents failed to act to remove the child 
from the situation;93 and (3) whether mitigating measures exist.94 
In sum, the clear disjunction among U.S. courts in evaluating Article 
13(b) defense claims illuminates the broader problem of inconsistent 
interpretations of the Convention’s exceptions. Surely, if courts within a 
single country arrive at such varied conclusions about how and when to 
apply the Article 13(b) exception, uniformity at the international level is 
virtually unattainable. Indeed, internationally, courts exhibit stark 
inconsistency.95 
 
 89.  Convention, supra note 1, at art. 13(b) (emphasis added). 
 90.  Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364−65 (M.D. Fla. 
2002). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  See Frier v. Frier, 969 F. Supp. 436, 443 (E.D. Mich. 1996). 
 93.  See Hazbun Escaf v. Rodriguez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603, 614 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 94.  See Walsh, 221 F.3d at 218. 
 95.  For instance, as previously noted, Brazil has been reported as demonstrating 
patterns of non-compliance with the Convention in recent years. In 2009, the U.S. State 
Department reported that Brazil had a tendency to treat Convention cases as custody 
determinations and deny applications for return based on the fact that the child in question 
had either become settled in his or her environment or adapted to the culture in Brazil, or 
both. See COMPLIANCE INFORMATION, supra note 23. These justifications are generally 
inconsistent with U.S. judicial interpretations the Convention. See Freidrich, 78 F.3d at 
1069; Charalambous, 627 F.3d at 469−70; Jaet, 2009 WL 35270, at *8. 
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2.  Japan’s Prospective Interpretation of the Article 13(b) Exception 
Japan only very recently gained official Convention signatory status, 
thus it is not surprising that, among the estimated 300 children abducted 
there from the U.S. between 1994 and 2013, the U.S. government—as of 
2013—did not know of a single example of a Japanese court granting 
favorable relief to a left-behind, American parent.96 In 2009, an estimated 
10,000 children in Japan were denied a relationship with their non-Japanese 
parent after a separation or divorce.97 That same year, U.S. citizens were 
involved in approximately 80 cases of international parental child abduction 
to Japan.98 Moreover, between 2007 and 2009, the number of cases of 
parental kidnapping in Japan practically doubled.99 In 2011, there were 100 
active cases of child abduction or wrongful retention of American children in 
Japan, involving a total of 140 children.100 
In light of these statistics, the U.S. and several other nations ultimately 
resorted to international pressure to secure Japan’s ratification of the 
Convention. However, it is unclear that Japan will now comply with the 
Convention. There are multiple reasons to suspect that Japan will 
demonstrate the same tendency as many current Member States: to 
interpret the Convention’s exceptions—particularly Article 13(b)—in an 
overly broad and inherently biased manner. As stated above, Japanese 
domestic family law strongly disfavors joint custody101 and thus conflicts 
with the Convention’s principles regarding custody rights and the interests of 
children. Further, Japanese courts often exhibit bias in favor of mothers or 
preserving Japanese heritage,102 which their future Convention decisions may 
wrongfully reflect. Finally, Japan seeks to protect female citizens returning 
there to escape domestic violence,103 which raises some concern that its 
courts will interpret the Article 13(b) exception too broadly. 
 
 96.  H. Rep. Chris Smith, Remarks at the 2172 Rayburn House Office Building: 
Resolving International Parental Child Abductions to Non-Hague Convention Countries 
(May 9, 2013), available at http://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2013-05-09_chairman  
_smith_on_resolving_international_parental_child_abductions_to_non-hague_convention_ 
countries_on_letterhead.pdf; Reynolds, supra note 30, at 367−68. 
 97.  Justin McCurry, Savoie’s Choice: Abduct or Fight?, GLOBAL POST (Oct. 27, 
2009, 6:45 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/japan/091026/child-abductions-japan. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Michelle Boykin, A Comparison of Japanese and Moroccan Approaches in 
Adopting the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 46 
FAM. L.Q. 451, 455 (2012). 
 100.  Id; Reynolds, supra note 30, at 378. 
 101.  Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380; Costa, supra note 36, at 376. 
 102.  Reynolds, supra note 30, at 382−84. 
 103.  Id. at 386−87; Costa, supra note 36, at 371. 
ZDENEK (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/10/2016  3:27 PM 
[VOL. 16:  209, 2014]  Hague Abduction Convention Compliance 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 225 
a.  Japanese Domestic Family Law and Family Court System 
First of all, Japanese domestic law does not closely align with the 
Convention’s stated principles.104 Family law in Japan is based on the 
“koseki” system.105 Upon marriage, every couple obtains a household 
registry (or a “koseki”) that establishes the legal status of the family and 
governs the relationships of the family unit.106 If a husband and wife 
divorce, the system provides that any children of the marriage are assigned 
exclusively to one side of the family or the other.107 Unlike most Member 
States’ legal systems, the Japanese system “simply has no mechanism for 
sharing children between two families.”108 
Similarly, under Japan’s Civil Code, there are two types of child custody: 
“shinken” and “kangoken.”109 While “shinken” can be fairly equated with 
legal custody, “kangoken” approximates physical custody.110 Both parents 
exercise “shinken,” of which “kangoken” is a component, over their minor 
children so long as the parents are married.111 However, if they divorce, 
“shinken” and “kangoken” are almost certain to remain together and be 
awarded to one parent, effectively limiting the exercise of legal parental 
authority to that parent only.112 A parent who earns sole custody in Japan 
essentially obtains “exclusive decision making authority over all aspects 
of the child’s life, including where the child will live and go to school and 
 
 104.  See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380; Costa, supra note 36, at 376; Jane 
Kitagawa, Left Behind: Parents Challenge Japan’s Dismal Child Abduction  Laws, 
METROPOLIS (Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://www.internationalfamilylawfirm.com/ 
2014/01/left-behind-parents-challenge-japans.html (“[Japan’s] divorce figures may be 
consistent with rates worldwide, but Japan is unique in that child abduction after separation or 
divorce is legal according to its family court.”  As for Japan’s ratification of the Convention, 
“[t]here are also doubts among left-behind parents, lawyers and others alike that not much 
will change unless domestic laws are also addressed”).  Id. 
 105.  Reynolds, supra note 30, at 379−80. 
 106.  Id. at 380. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  G. M. Filisko, When Global Families Fail, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2010), http://www. 
abajournal.com/magazine/article/when_global_families_fail/. 
 109.  Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 380−81; Colin P.A. Jones, Towards an “Asian” Child Abduction 
Treaty? Some Observations on Singapore and Japan Joining the Hague Convention 11 
(Asian Law Inst., Working Paper No. 031, 2013), available at http://law.nus.edu.sg/asli/ 
pdf/WPS031.pdf. 
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even whether the other parent will be excluded from their life.”113 Not only 
are joint and partial custody arrangements not legally recognized in Japan,114 
but courts award sole custody to the mother at the expense of the father 
about 80% of the time.115 Although there is evidence suggesting the public 
attitude in Japan regarding family law and the best interests of the child 
may be changing in favor of joint post-divorce parental involvement,116 
there is no practical way to infuse those values within the judiciary.117 
Further, the judiciary has shown no signs of such adaptation thus far.118 
The Japanese court system may also present some difficulties; most family 
law in Japan is created judicially rather than statutorily, thus it is very 
unlikely for a foreign parent, even with proof of a pre-existing custody 
order, to receive a favorable ruling from a Japanese judge.119 
 
 113.  Jones, supra note 112, at 11. 
 114.  Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380. 
 115.  Kamoto Itsuku, Behind Japan’s Ratification of the Hague Abduction Convention, 
NIPPON.COM (June 14, 2013), http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00079/. 
 116.  See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 386; Lawmakers Launch Group to Ensure 
Visitations After Divorce, KYODO NEWS INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www. 
globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/140318/lawmakers-launch-group-
ensure-visitations-after-divorc (reporting that Japanese lawmakers arranged a meeting 
with the goal of enacting legislation to improve post-divorce visitation rights between 
children and parents). 
 117.  Reynolds, supra note 30, at 382. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 381. Another potential concern is that Japanese family court orders are 
known for their general lack of enforceability due to judicial discretion to not enforce 
judgments, among other limitations. Id. at 381−82; see also Colin P.A. Jones, In the Best 
Interests of the Court: What American Lawyers Need to Know About Child Custody and 
Visitation in Japan, 8 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 166, 177 (2007) (noting that Japanese 
judges have “no court marshals with police-like powers to carry out their orders,” and have 
limited ability to hold parties in contempt of court). Even in the limited situations in which 
judges have enforcement mechanisms available to them, they “may not care whether this 
result is achieved” and often take advantage of their discretionary power to refuse 
enforcement. Id; see also Reynolds, supra note 30, at 382. Japan’s legislation to implement 
the Convention reflects the traditional unenforceability problem, as it “contains extensive 
provisions for enforcement of a return order.”  Jeremy D. Morley, Japan and the Hague 
Abduction Convention: Implementation and Practical Effects, INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW 
FIRM (June 11, 2014, 1:36 PM), http://www.internationalfamilylawfirm.com/search? updated-
max=2014-07-03T12:19:00-07:00&max-results=20&start=13&by-date=false. These 
legislative enforcement mechanisms will at least give Japanese courts deciding Convention 
cases a starting point in the “unprecedented” realm of enforceable family court orders; 
however, as one commentator suggests, “[t]ime will tell whether they prove to be effective.” 
Id. If Japan’s enforcement provisions prove successful, then it is of even greater concern 
that its courts tend to grant sole custody arrangements in favor of mothers and Japanese 
citizens at the expense of fathers and foreign parents. Contrarily, even if enforceability 
remains weak, the need to bring Japan into compliance through a neutral process persists. As 
discussed above, the Convention primarily serves to return children to their States of 
habitual residence, which, by implication, necessitates an enforceable court order. Inevitably, 
Japanese courts will enforce Convention return orders to some extent, lest the international 
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Finally, Japanese courts often demonstrate bias in family court 
proceedings, both in favor of a mother over a father and in favor of a 
Japanese parent over a foreign parent.120 Taimie L. Bryant’s research in 
the 1980s and 1990s illustrates the motive to preserve Japanese identity.121 In 
Bryant’s initial study—between 1981 and 1984—of family court 
mediation proceedings122 involving a Japanese parent and a foreign 
parent, she observed that every decision entailed “elaborate provisions to 
protect the [child’s] Japanese identity at the expense of [his or her] non-
Japanese identity.”123 While the Japanese parent usually won the custody 
battle, the non-Japanese parent won only in limited circumstances where 
he or she agreed to raise the child with an exclusively Japanese identity.124 
For instance, the foreign parent could agree to a condition that “in the 
event of remarriage to a non-Japanese or relocation outside of Japan, there 
would be another round of mediation to reassess custody.”125 In her 
second study in 1992, Bryant found that although non-Japanese mothers 
were awarded custody more often than before, factors such as which 
parent was more familiar with the Japanese language or which would be 
more likely to raise the child with a Japanese identity almost always 
factored into the decision.126 Moreover, not a single actor in the mediation 
proceedings ever mentioned the possibility of “bicultural identity” or 
“blended families” with regard to the environment in which the child 
would mature after the parents’ divorce.127 
As discussed above, Japan does not recognize joint custody and 
usually grants sole custody to the mother.128 This precedential pattern may 
limit Convention-return proceedings. For instance, if a mother were to 
wrongfully abduct and retain her child in Japan in violation of the 
Convention, it would be difficult to imagine a Japanese judge dispensing 
 
pressure overwhelm them, and Japan’s detailed provisions written for that purpose likely 
indicate that they will at least try. 
 120.  Reynolds, supra note 30, at 382−84. 
 121.  Taimie L. Bryant, Family Models, Family Dispute Resolution and Family Law 
in Japan, 14 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 18−19 (1995). 
 122.  Mediation is required before parties can litigate most family law disputes in 
Japan. Id. at 2. 
 123.  Id. at 18. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 18 n.43. 
 126.  Id. at 19. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380, 382−83. 
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with her arguments and promptly returning the child to his or her father in 
the State of habitual residence. Notably, the Convention defines a 
violation of the treaty as a breach of the rights of custody of the left-behind 
parent.129 This definition seems to presume that the left-behind parent is 
capable of having legal custody rights over the child. 
This presumption is generally true in Convention proceedings.130 For 
example, in the U.S., joint custody arrangements are increasingly 
preferred.131 Some American states have statutory presumptions in favor 
of joint custody, in which case the parents share equal legal rights over the 
child after divorce, rebuttable only by a showing of legitimate 
justification for why the arrangement is inappropriate.132 As for the states 
that do not explicitly delineate such presumptions, statutes affecting 
custody have been revised to reflect new cultural preferences in favor of 
dual-parent involvement after divorce, and traditional presumptions 
favoring maternal custody have been largely eliminated.133 Likewise, many 
other Member States are moving towards a post-divorce presumption in 
favor of joint custody.134 
However, in Japan, where joint custody is neither culturally embedded 
nor evident in judicial decisions,135 a court would likely struggle to 
recognize the validity of left-behind parents’ joint custody rights. Such 
hesitation would be even more likely if the left-behind parent happened to 
be a non-Japanese father, as discussed above.136 Finally, in light of studies 
showing that Japanese judges and mediators often consider the 
preservation of national identity as an important factor in their decisions,137 it 
seems likely that Japan will be particularly hesitant in promptly returning 
children to their State of habitual residence in compliance with the 
Convention. This remains a problem for both mothers and fathers whose 
children have been wrongfully abducted to Japan. Even if a Japanese court 
 
 129.  Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3. 
 130.  See, e.g., Israel’s Justice Minister: Divorced Parents Must Share Custody of 
Children, HAARETZ.COM (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/israel-s-
justice-minister-divorced-parents-must-share-custody-of-children-1.408169 (reporting that the 
Israeli Justice Minister announced his intention to adopt public committee recommendations to 
overturn the presumption of maternal custody of young children after divorce). 
 131.  Bernardo Cuadra, Family Law—Maternal and Joint Custody Presumptions for 
Unmarried Parents: Constitutional and Policy Considerations in Massachusetts and Beyond, 
32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 599, 599 (2010). 
 132.  Id. at 600. 
 133.  Id. at 599. 
 134.  Additional examples include France, Belgium, Spain, and Australia. Love 
Before the Law: Child Custody Set for Overhaul, THE LOCAL: GERMANY’S NEWS IN 
ENGLISH (July 2, 2010, 11:34 AM), http://www.thelocal.de/20100702/28199. 
 135.  See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380−81; Costa, supra note 36, at 376. 
 136.  See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 381−83. 
 137.  See id. at 383−84; Bryant, supra note 121, at 18−19. 
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were not faced with the issue of maternal bias, cultural bias favoring Japanese 
identity could interfere with the Convention’s terms and intent. 
For these reasons, Japan’s current system of family law may  be 
irreconcilable with the treaty it just ratified and now, presumably, seeks to 
enforce. While the Convention is grounded in “widely-accepted notions 
of what is in the best interests of the child,” family law in Japan largely 
draws on “consensual arrangements in which the government provides a 
largely administrative function . . . without any supervision over the welfare 
of the child affected by them.”138 Although views on post-divorce 
visitation are changing in Japan,139 Japanese courts still believe that 
visitation by the non-custodial parent is burdensome to the child and, 
consequently, award visitation rights only when they expire within a short 
period.140 
The view of Japanese courts that the interests of children are best served 
by granting sole custody to one parent while denying visitation to the other 
stands in stark contrast with the views held by the judiciaries of other 
Member States, which generally believe children are better off having both 
parents in their lives.141 Japan’s historical approach may limit 
enforcement of the Convention as intended, particularly in light of the role 
of “undertakings” in Convention-return proceedings,142 which could 
theoretically establish visitation rights as a condition of the child’s 
return.143 If Japanese courts do not consider such an undertaking to be in 
 
 138.  Jones, supra note 112, at 25. 
 139.  See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 386; Lawmakers Launch Group to Ensure 
Visitations, supra note 116. 
 140.  Boykin, supra note 99, at 460. 
 141.  See Love Before the Law, supra note 134. 
 142.  Undertakings are positive or negative conditions imposed by judges governing 
the relationships among the parties during the transition period until the State of habitual 
residence can determine the child’s safety, welfare, custody, and other similar issues. See 
Mairead Britton, Undertakings: Satisfactory Safeguard to Grave Risk?, CORK ONLINE 
LAW REVIEW, http://corkonlinelawreview.com/editions/2003/2003xi.pdf (citing P v. B [1994] 
3 IR 507). 
 143.  Undertakings cover a wide range of issues and may include protective orders, 
orders to provide temporary financial assistance, or “promises designed to minimize 
emotional trauma to a child threatened with separation from a primary caretaker.” Hon. 
James D. Gorbolino, The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction: A Guide for Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (2012), at 101, available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/hagueguide.pdf/$file/hagueguide.pdf. Presumably, 
post-return visitation arrangements between a child and his or her parent could fall within 
the scope of “promises designed to minimize emotional trauma to a child threatened with 
separation from a primary caretaker.” 
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the best interests of the child, they may decide to refuse return altogether 
and subsequently use the Convention’s “interests of the child” language 
to justify their decision. 
American and Japanese courts may apply distinct interpretations of 
certain specific language of the Convention. For example, an American 
court would likely interpret the “interests of the child” provision as 
requiring a child’s return to his or her State of habitual residence on the 
assumption that its courts are better suited to make determinations affecting 
the child’s welfare. However, a Japanese court would likely interpret the 
same provision as giving it the discretion to refuse a child’s return, as 
doing so would contradict its policy of minimizing changes in custody 
arrangements and limiting decisions regarding assigning the child to a 
single parent. If the Convention is really founded on furthering the interests 
of children, as it claims to be, then Japan’s assessment of what “interests 
of the child” means may be irreconcilable with other Member States’ 
interpretations. 
b.  Japan’s Motive to Protect Female Citizens from Domestic Violence 
Another major reason to presume that the Japanese judiciary will construe 
the Article 13(b) exception broadly and subjectively is the Japanese 
government’s desire to protect women fleeing from domestic abuse, which it 
articulated prior to its decision to ratify the Convention.144 The U.S. 
government does not recognize Japan’s domestic violence apprehension 
as a valid concern and certainly not as a legitimate justification for 
circumventing the Convention.145 The U.S. State Department noted that it 
has not found a significant number of cases involving actual domestic 
violence between parents and, in many cases, it found that the allegations of 
domestic violence were largely unsubstantiated.146 
However, of the nine Convention cases decided by U.S. Courts of 
Appeals between July 2000 and January 2001, seven involved mothers 
who abducted their child(ren) on the basis of alleged domestic violence.147 
This illustrates that domestic abuse is actually a relatively common issue 
that arises in connection with Article 13(b) situations, and it certainly 
cannot be said that American courts are unfamiliar with it. Regardless of 
the official U.S. perspective, it is commonsensical that a genuine situation 
of domestic violence can pose a “grave risk of harm” to a child returned 
 
 144.  Reynolds, supra note 30, at 386−87. 
 145.  Costa, supra note 36, at 371−72. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and Progress: The Need 
for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 277 (2002). 
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to such circumstances. U.S. courts have recognized this148 and have 
recently moved toward allowing the Article 13(b) defense in cases of 
domestic abuse overall.149 Moreover, the Sixth Meeting of the Special 
Commission to Review the Operation of the Convention concluded that 
the consideration of domestic violence is properly within any application 
of Article 13(b).150 
Many other Convention signatories have considered the issue of 
allegations of inappropriate behavior or sexual abuse in the Article 13(b) 
context.151 The accusations were dismissed as unfounded in certain cases 
in Belgium,152 Canada,153 France,154 New Zealand,155 and Switzerland,156 
illustrating the straightforward approach taken by many Member States. 
However, where the accusations are not unfounded, courts are divided 
over “whether a detailed investigation should be undertaken in the State 
of refuge, or . . . the State of habitual residence, with interim measures 
being taken to attempt to protect the child on his return.”157 In cases in the 
 
 148.  See, e.g., Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 149.  Jeremy D. Morley, The Future of the Grave Risk of Harm Defense in Hague 
Cases, THE LAW OFFICE OF JEREMY D. MORLEY: INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW, http://www.  
international-divorce.com/grave_risk_harm_defense.htm. 
 150.  HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT OF PART I OF THE SIXTH MEETING OF THE SPECIAL 
COMM’N ON THE PRACTICAL OPERATION OF THE 1980 HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION CONVENTION 
AND THE 1996 CHILD PROT. CONVENTION ¶ 129 (2011), available at http://www.hcch. 
net/upload/wop/abduct2012pd14e.pdf. 
 151.  See generally HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, CASE LAW 
ANALYSIS, http://www.incadat.com/index.cfm?act=analysis.show&sl=3&lng=1 (follow 
“Exceptions to Return” hyperlink; then follow “Grave Risk of Harm” hyperlink; then 
follow “Analysis of Inappropriate Behaviour / Sexual Abuse” hyperlink). 
 152.  Tribunal de Première Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First Instance] Civ Liège, Réf, 
March 14, 2002, REVUE TRIMESTRILLE DE DROIT FAMILILAL [Rev.trim.dr.fam] 2003, 398 
(Belg.). 
 153.  Droit de la Famille - 2675 (1997) (Can.); J.M. c. H.A., Droit de la Famille - 08497, 
(2008) (Can.). 
 154.  Cour d’appel [CA] [regional courts of appeal] 3eme chamber de la famille, 
March 4, 1998, 5704759 (Fr.). 
 155.  Wolfe v. Wolfe [1993] NZFLR 277 (N.Z.). 
 156.  Obergericht des Kantons Zürich [Appellate Court of the Canton Zurich], Jan. 
28, 1997, U/NL960145/II.ZK, (Switz.). 
 157.  CASE LAW ANALYSIS, supra note 151. 
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United Kingdom,158 Finland,159 and Ireland,160 the courts ordered return 
with mandatory investigation in the State of habitual residence, whereas 
courts in China161 and the U.S.162 ordered return with a mandatory 
investigation in the State of refuge. However, some United Kingdom163 
and U.S.164 courts refused return altogether. This variation in outcomes 
among Member States applying the Article 13(b) defense to domestic 
violence situations is alarming because many of these States have cultural 
and legal similarities and have been Convention signatories for many 
years.165 There is certainly no reason to believe that Japan will be an 
exception to this trend of decisional inconsistency in light of Japan’s 
clearly expressed concern about protecting victims of domestic abuse.166 
It is more likely that Japan’s Convention decisions will fall closer to the 
“refusal of return” end of the spectrum than the “dismissal of accusations” 
end. 
The fact that Member nations have varying interpretations of domestic 
violence likely strengthened Japan’s initial hesitation to join the treaty.167 If 
Japan views domestic violence more broadly than the U.S. and other 
Member States, then Japanese courts will likely apply a more expansive 
Article 13(b) interpretation than other States would think necessary to 
ensure the safety of children. For instance, Japanese courts might deny a 
child’s return on the basis of a “grave risk of harm” where there are only 
bare allegations of abuse and minimal concrete supporting evidence, or 
 
 158.  N. v. N. (Abduction: Article 13 Defence) [1995] EWHC (Fam) 116, 1 FLR 107 
(Eng.). 
 159.  Supreme Court of Finland [1996] 151, S96/2489. 
 160.  A.S. v. P.S. (Child Abduction), [1998] 2 I.R. 244, (Superior Appellate Court) 
(Ir.). 
 161.  D. v. G., 1179 HKCU 1 (Appellate Court 2001) (China). 
 162.  Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 26 (1st Cir. 2002); Kufner, 480 F. Supp. 2d 
at 516. 
 163.  Q., Petitioner (2001) S.L.T. 243 (Scot.). 
 164.  Danaipour, 386 F.3d at 303. 
 165.  For example, Canada ratified the Convention on June 29, 1983. STATUS TABLE, 
supra note 2. Canada and the U.S. both have common law legal systems, which emphasize 
“judicial independence as a prerequisite to justice.” Selina Koonar, Justice Systems in 
Canada and the United States, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, BUSINESS LAW SECTION: 
YOUNG LAWYER FORUM NEWSLETTER (2009), available at http://www.americanbar. 
org/newsletter/publications/law_trends_news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/10_summer
_ lit_feat1.html. Canada’s legal system has even borrowed American case law for precedential 
value in certain areas of Canadian law that lack sufficient precedents, such as privacy 
rights. Id. 
 166.  See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 369−70. 
 167.  See Costa, supra note 36, at 371−72. 
ZDENEK (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/10/2016  3:27 PM 
[VOL. 16:  209, 2014]  Hague Abduction Convention Compliance 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 233 
where the prospective abuse, if actuated, would endanger someone other 
than the child.168 
Consequently, the Convention’s primary goal of promptly returning 
children to their State of habitual residence would often be circumvented 
in a way that the U.S. and many other States would find wrongful or non-
compliant. In any case, the courts of the State of habitual residence should 
be the ones making these types of determinations if they are to uphold the 
spirit of the Convention. Scholars have emphasized that Article 13(b) is not 
an automatic bar to the return of a child in the context of domestic abuse 
allegations; rather, it is suggested that a proper application should include 
consideration of evidence regarding the returned-to State’s ability to protect 
the child.169 
B.  Difficulties Arising from Japan’s Implementing Legislation 
Another reason to question Japan’s likely enforcement of the Convention 
is because of the details specified in its implementing legislation, “The 
Act in Connection with the Implementation of the Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction” (“the Act”).170 The Act 
contains 153 articles, exclusive of the rules that the Japanese Supreme 
Court will eventually provide to further outline the procedures under the 
Convention.171 Under Articles 119 and 120 of the Act, a losing party is 
allowed to apply for retrial after exhausting appeals opportunities, a process 
that some criticize as “inconsistent with the Convention mandate that 
return cases be handled expeditiously.”172 
Another aspect of the Act that may present problems for petitioning 
parties is its provision for court-directed mediation of Convention disputes. 
 
 168.  Alternatively, as previously discussed, U.S. courts today would likely require 
concrete evidence and proof of specificity. Thus, an issue of inconsistent interpretation arises. 
 169.  See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 389 (citing Julie Alanen, When Human Rights 
Conflict: Mediating International Parental Kidnapping Disputes Involving the Domestic 
Violence Defense, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 49, 73 (2008)). 
 170.  “Act for Implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction” (tentative translation), Act No. 48 of 2013 (Japan), available at www. 
hcch.net/upload/abduct_impl_act_jp.pdf [hereinafter the Act]. 
 171.  Id; Jones, supra note 112, at 22. 
 172.  Jones, supra note 112, at 23. Further, Articles 122 and 123 authorize the court 
in a return case to prohibit an abducted child’s removal from Japan.  However, Japanese 
courts never claimed such express authority before deciding to ratify the Convention, so 
this provision may raise suspicion regarding Japan’s intentions to strictly comply with the 
Convention’s mandates. See id. 
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Pursuant to Article 144 of the Act, a court “with the consent of the parties, by 
its own authority, may refer the case seeking the return of the child to the 
conciliation of domestic relations at any time.”173 Under Article 145, any 
agreement reached through such conciliation “shall have the same effect 
as a final order to order the return of the child that has become final and 
binding.”174 Further, Article 146 allows the court to suspend the 
Convention proceedings until the conciliation is complete,175 and Article 
147 provides that, when conciliation concludes, “it shall be deemed that 
the petition for the case seeking return of child has been withdrawn.”176 
One concern arising from these articles is that Japanese judges frequently 
have various means of promoting agreement between the parties; “[i]f this 
results in return cases being funneled into the same sort of mediation 
already used in domestic custody cases and held before mediators who 
must be Japanese nationals, it may not be good thing for a non-Japanese 
parents.”177 Moreover, the Act does not clearly delineate the process of 
reactivating a Convention case if mediation discussions become deadlocked, 
which may place foreign parents at an even greater disadvantage.178 
More importantly, Article 28(1)(iv) of the Act serves to replicate the 
Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” exception of the Convention, but Article 
28(2) gives the Court discretion to consider a wide range of factors in 
determining whether the exception applies.179 Judges may look to the risk 
 
 173.  The Act, supra note 170, at art. 144. 
 174.  Id. at art. 145. 
 175.  Id. at art 146. 
 176.  Id. at art. 147. 
 177.  Jones, supra note 26. 
 178.  Id. While there are strong justifications for favoring mediation over other legal 
processes, there is significant evidence indicating the inadequacy of Japan’s current family law 
mediation system. Mediation is required before litigation of most family law disputes in 
Japan, but the mediation “perpetuates the ideal of having one family model within Japanese 
society.” See Bryant, supra note 121, at 2. Private mediation services are lacking, putting a 
tremendous burden on the public system. Id. at 9. As a result, “the qualifications, training, and 
perspectives of the mediators cannot help but influence the role of family court mediation 
in shaping the concepts of the family.” Id. Thus, allowing Japan’s mediators to determine post-
Convention-return conditions will fail to address the root of the problem. Japanese 
mediators would likely display the same biases as Japanese courts, and foreign nations 
would lack the incentive that they would have if assured of a neutral mediation process. 
 179.  Jones, supra note 112, at 24. The full text of Article 28(2) reads: “The court, 
when judging whether or not the grounds listed in item (iv) of the preceding paragraph 
exist, shall consider all circumstances such as those listed below: (i) Whether or not there 
is a risk that the child would be subject to the words and deeds, such as physical violence, 
which would cause physical or psychological harm (referred to as “violence, etc.” in the 
following item) by the petitioner, in the state of habitual residence; (ii) Whether or not there is 
a risk that the respondent would be subject to violence, etc. by the petitioner in such a 
manner as to cause psychological harm to the child, if the respondent and the child entered 
into the state of habitual residence; (iii) Whether or not there are circumstances that make it 
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of violence, which includes verbal violence, towards either the taking parent 
or the child if he or she were to be returned.180 Judges may also consider 
the presence of circumstances that might hinder the ability of the taking 
parent or requesting parent to care for the child after the child’s return, which, 
as one author has suggested, is effectively “authorizing something close 
to an evaluation of both parents’ custodial capacities” in violation of 
Article 19 of the Convention.181 
Article 28 of the Act is particularly problematic, as it shows that the 
Japanese government was likely using its implementing legislation to 
circumvent the intent of the Convention even before officially ratifying it. 
Furthermore, Japan is explicitly broadening the scope of the Article 13(b) 
exception beyond what other States interpret the proper scope to be. Pursuant 
to the language of the Act, a Japanese court deciding a Convention case must 
consider whether there is a risk that the child would be subject to “words 
and deeds” (subsequently referred to as “violence, etc.”) that would cause 
physical or psychological harm upon the child’s return to the State of 
habitual residence.182 Courts must also consider whether the respondent 
would be subject to “violence, etc.” by the petitioning parent in a way that 
would cause psychological harm to the child if the respondent and child were 
both to return to the State of habitual residence.183 Finally, a court must 
consider whether any circumstances exist that would make it difficult for 
either parent to care for the child in the State of habitual residence.184 
Under Japan’s intended scheme, a foreign parent could presumably risk 
losing his or her children to the Japanese abductor-parent merely because 
the foreign parent might raise his or her voice at a child, or even the 
Japanese parent, in a way that would constitute verbal violence.185 
Moreover, a court could potentially deny a child’s return to the foreign, 
left-behind parent on the sole ground that the foreign parent is going 
through financial difficulties and thus may experience some hardship due 
 
difficult for the petitioner or the respondent to provide care for the child in the state of 
habitual residence.” The Act, supra note 170, art. 28(2). 
 180.  Jones, supra note 112, at 24. 
 181.  Id. at 24−25. 
 182.  The Act, supra note 170, at art. 28(2)(i). 
 183.  Id. at art. 28(2)(ii). 
 184.  Id. at art. 28(2)(iii). 
 185.  See id. at art. 28(2)(i) (referring to “the words and deeds . . . which would cause 
physical or psychological harm” (emphasis added); id. at art. 28(2)(ii). 
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to the additional expenses of raising a child.186 Granted, the interpretation 
would be entirely within the discretion of the Japanese court. Taken as a 
whole, these legislative provisions enacted by Japan to implement the 
Convention into domestic law tend to render some suspicion regarding its 
prospective compliance.187 
C.  Circumstances of Japan’s Ratification as a Factor                             
Indicating Conflict 
The circumstances surrounding Japan’s ultimate decision to ratify the 
Convention are themselves indicative of the likelihood that Japan will not 
strictly uphold the Convention. Some commentators note that Japan 
ultimately conceded to the treaty only after overwhelming international 
pressure by the U.S. and other Member States.188 In 2007, the pressure 
began with a U.S. initiative calling on Japan to take immediate measures 
to solve the problem of international parental child abduction.189 In 2009, 
having yet to receive effective response, the U.S., sponsored by the U.S. 
Embassy in Tokyo, initiated a “Symposium on International Parental Child 
Abduction” to address Japanese courts’ ineffective resolution of the 
problem.190 The embassies of the U.S., United Kingdom, France, and 
Canada subsequently issued a joint press release encouraging Japan to 
ratify the Convention.191 
International pressure continued in early 2010 when the U.S. and seven 
other Western nations sent ambassadors to meet with the Japanese Prime 
Minister aiming to encourage Japan to address domestic family law issues 
relating to custody.192 In September 2010, the U.S. passed House 
Resolution 1326, calling on the Japanese government to address the 
problem of U.S. citizen children being abducted to and retained in Japan, and 
 
 186.  See id. at art. 28(2)(iii) (referring to “circumstances that make it difficult for the 
petitioner or the respondent to provide care for the child in the state of habitual residence”). 
 187. Jones, supra note 112, at 24−25. 
 188.  See Yaffa Fredrick, Japan’s Child Abduction Laws in Limbo, WORLD POLICY 
BLOG (May 6, 2014), http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/05/06/japans-child-abduction- 
laws-limbo (quoting Jeremy Morley); Jane Kitagawa, Left Behind: Parents Challenge 
Japan’s Dismal Child Abduction Laws, METROPOLIS (Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://www. 
internationalfamilylawfirm.com/2014/01/left-behind-parents-challenge-japans.html (quoting 
Bruce Gherbetti). 
 189.  The initiative referred to is the “Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National 
Government Act.” Openness Promotes Effectiveness in Our National Government Act, Pub. 
L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007); Boykin, supra note 99, at 458−59. 
 190.  Boykin, supra note 99, at 459. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. 
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urging Japan to cooperate with other nations and promptly adopt the 
Convention.193 
Another symposium was held in March 2010, where ambassadors to 
Japan from the U.S. and several other countries met with Japanese officials 
to hear expert discussions on international parental child abduction.194 At 
the conclusion of the symposium, the ambassadors issued a more favorable 
press release, still urging Japan to join the Convention, but indicating that 
Japan had made some positive efforts and initiatives.195 In May 2011, 
Japan created a legislative plan to move towards conformity with the 
Convention, and, in July 2011, a Justice Ministry panel convened to 
establish judicial procedures for returning children pursuant to the 
Convention.196 Finally, in November 2011, the Japanese Prime Minister 
announced that the bill to join the treaty would be sent to the Japanese 
legislature.197 
Considering this extensive record of international pressure, it is highly 
unlikely that Japan joined the Convention on its own initiative. Currently, it 
seems doubtful that Japan will emerge as a strict enforcer of a treaty to 
which it probably never wished to belong in the first place. Until Japan 
implements domestic reforms to conform its family law and court systems to 
the intent of the Convention, prospects of compliance remain uncertain. 
IV.  A PROSPECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION 
As discussed below, international mediation provides the necessary 
element of neutrality to achieve successful enforcement of the Convention. 
At the outset, mediation has certain advantages and limitations that 
warrant discussion. Next, an exploration of the proposed system of 
international mediation will demonstrate how it would overcome the 
 
 193.  Under the precise language of the Resolution, Japan is called on to address 
“[t]he urgent problem of abduction to and retention of the United States citizen children in 
Japan, to work closely with the Government of the United States to return these children to 
their custodial parent or to the original jurisdiction for a custody determination in the 
United States, to provide left-behind parents with immediate access to their children, and 
to adopt without delay the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction.” Id. (quoting H.R. 1326, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010)). 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Notably, by May 2010, Japan had already been pressed to ratify the Convention by 
thirty-two countries. Id. at 460. 
 196.  Id. at 461. 
 197.  Id. at 462. 
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typical disadvantages of mediation and incorporate effective mechanisms, 
including undertakings, measures expanding mediator authority, selection of 
mediators through an ideal candidate body, and comprehensive selection 
standards and training of mediators. An illustration will then show how 
the proposed international mediation system would function in practice.  
Finally, the overarching issue of whether the proposed system requires an 
amendment to the Convention will be addressed. 
A.  Mediation as a Means of Achieving Neutrality in                           
Convention Enforcement 
In recent years, the U.S. proposed and implemented measures in response 
to Convention non-compliance.198 There is some evidence that unilateral, 
serious sanctions targeting one particular country are effective;199 however, 
such a tactic does not address the cause or the extent of the problem 
internationally. From an international perspective, the primary issue is 
that countries are able to take advantage of the broad language of the 
Convention’s exceptions, interpreting them in a way that satisfies their 
own nationalistic biases and ultimately thwarting the Convention’s purposes. 
The problem of favoring one’s own country may be intransigent and 
hence, any effective solution must inject an element of neutrality into the 
judicial process. 
In the context of the Article 13(b) defense to returning a child to his or 
her State of habitual residence, one way such neutrality and consistency 
may arise is through international mediation. Theoretically, such a system 
would provide an international list of mediators, a body charged with 
 
 198.  For instance, the “Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction 
Prevention and Return Act of 2014” was introduced in Congress on September 28, 2013 
and signed by the President on August 8, 2014; it authorizes the President to take certain 
actions against noncompliant countries, including: “a demarche (a diplomatic request or 
intercession with a foreign official or a protest about a government’s policy or actions); an 
official public statement detailing unresolved cases; a public condemnation; a delay or 
cancellation of one or more bilateral working, official, or state visits; the withdrawal, 
limitation, or suspension of U.S. development or security assistance, or assistance to a 
central government; a formal request to a foreign country to extradite an individual who is 
engaged in abduction and who has been formally accused of, charged with, or convicted of an 
extraditable offense; or other commensurate actions”. See Sean and David Goldman 
International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2014, H.R. 3212, 113th Cong. 
(2d Sess. 2014), at § 202 [hereinafter Sean and David Goldman Act of 2014]. 
 199.  An example can be found in the case of Sean Goldman in 2009, where the U.S. 
was successful in its petition for the child’s return from Brazil only after 
congressional threats that involved cutting off trade benefits. The threats, if carried out, 
would have caused a substantial economic impact. See Sean Goldman’s Return to U.S. 
Imminent?, CBS NEWS (Dec. 23, 2009, 7:25 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/sean-
goldmans-return-to-us-imminent/. 
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selecting candidates, and specific criteria for how mediators would be chosen 
and certified. The parties involved in a Convention dispute would then 
have to stipulate to submit to mediation in the country retaining 
jurisdiction over the matter (i.e., the court of the abducted-to nation). 
As an introductory example, consider a child whose mother abducts him 
from his habitual residence in Japan, in breach of his father’s custody rights, 
and takes him to the United States. The mother then initiates Convention 
proceedings in the U.S. and invokes the Article 13(b) exception, on grounds 
that clearly fall short of a typical “grave risk of harm” situation. The 
Convention would mandate the Court to order the child’s return to Japan, 
but it could also order mediation to resolve disputes between the parties 
over any issues beyond the scope of the Convention.200 Both parties would 
then have to stipulate in the U.S. court to be bound by the outcome of 
international mediation, and subsequently choose and agree on a 
representative from the list of international mediators to handle their case. 
Ideally, the parties would reach a mutually agreeable solution with the 
assistance of the international mediator. The mediator would draft an 
opinion reflecting the parties’ agreements, and the U.S. court could 
subsequently adopt the mediated solution as a judicial order. An even 
more effective solution would allow (or oblige) the Japanese court to 
register a mirror order of the U.S. judicial order, thus giving it binding 
legal effect in both States. 
B.  Mediation: Background, Advantages, and Limitations 
Mediation is “one of the most widely promoted methods of alternative 
dispute resolution in family law.”201 The 2001 meeting of the Special 
Commission to review the operation of the Convention (“the Commission”) 
recommended that “Central Authorities”202 regularly seek voluntary return 
 
 200.  For example, such issues might encompass visitation, custody, contact, living 
arrangements, payment of child support, or reimbursement of other expenses. Delegating 
the resolution of these issues to international mediation would likely give courts a greater 
incentive to return children to their States of habitual residence without delay. 
 201.  HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, REVISED DRAFT: GUIDE TO GOOD 
PRACTICE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS ON 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION, PART V—MEDIATION 11, available at http://www. 
hcch.net/upload/wop/abdguide5_mediation_en.pdf [hereinafter GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE]. 
 202.  “Central Authorities” are the organizational bodies charged with communication 
related to, and implementation of, the Convention within their respective Member States. 
For example, in the U.S., the Central Authority is the U.S. Department of State, Office of 
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“where possible and appropriate . . . by referral of parties to a specialist 
organization providing an appropriate mediation service.”203 The Commission 
also recognized that courts play a central role in that respect.204 At a 2009 
Council meeting, members of the Hague Conference adopted 
conclusions and recommendations requiring the establishment of a 
“Working Party” ( “the Party”) to “promote the development of mediation 
structures to help resolve cross-border disputes concerning custody of or 
contact with children.”205 The Party consisted of experts from independent 
mediation groups, from a handful of parties to the Convention, and from 
non-contracting States.206 The Party subsequently created “Draft Principles” 
for establishing mediation structures, which some States had already 
adopted into domestic law by early 2011.207 Those same States also 
designated “Central Contact Point[s]” for international family mediation, 
which provide specialized information regarding international mediation 
services in their respective jurisdictions.208 The 2011 Commission meeting 
encouraged other States to follow the trend by creating their own “Central 
Contact Point(s).”209 
For purposes of using international mediation to resolve Convention 
disputes, the establishment of the Party indicates some progression. Ideally, 
another Hague Conference should be held in order to encourage the 
expansion of this group of experts. The experts could then work together 
to create mediation structures similar to the ones discussed above, but this 
time with the goal of establishing a single, uniform international mediation 
system. The structure would ultimately serve as a blueprint for the selected 
international mediators. As for the “Central Contact Point(s)” already 
initiated by some States, it may be beneficial to draw candidates for the 
international mediator list from those offices’ databases because they 
 
Children’s Issues. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, AUTHORITIES UNDER THE 
CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD 
ABDUCTION: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities. 
details&aid=133. As for Japan, it designated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as its Central 
Authority. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, AUTHORITIES UNDER THE, 
CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD 
ABDUCTION: JAPAN, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=974. 
 203.  GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 201, at 14. The 2006 meeting of the 
Commission reaffirmed the 2001 recommendations. Id. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. at 15. 
 206.  Id. at 16. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. at 39. 
 209.  Id. 
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likely possess valuable international mediation skills and could be 
summoned from various States that are parties to the Convention.210 
Mediation has several advantages over other forms of dispute resolution. 
For instance, mediated solutions are more sustainable and more likely to 
achieve compliance than court solutions.211 Moreover, mediation is flexible, 
cost-effective,212 and “empowers the parties to face future conflicts in a 
more constructive way.”213 Disadvantages of mediation include the risk 
that agreed-upon solutions will not have legal effect in the future,214 the 
special attention required in situations of possible domestic violence, and 
the impossibility of resolving some conflicts in a civil manner. Another 
problem that arises in the context of international family mediation is the 
fact that jurisdictions often have different perspectives of how much weight 
to accord the best interests of the child.215 Because mediators have limited 
procedural powers (e.g., with regard to interviewing the child), certain 
safeguards may be necessary to protect the best interests of the children.216 
 
 210.  See id. Presumably, every mediator candidate should reside in a country that 
has ratified the Convention. Otherwise, the mediators would have no relevant connection 
to the treaty. 
 211.  Id. at 20. 
 212.  Id. at 20−21. The advantage of cost-effectiveness is particularly important in 
the context of Convention proceedings, as the left-behind parent often lacks the financial 
resources necessary to travel to the abducted-to nation and litigate there for an extended 
period of time. For instance, in the previously cited case of Sean Goldman, the father 
(David Goldman) spent approximately $360,000 in legal and travel expenses over a period 
of four and a half years. Timothy Weinstein, The Financial Cost of Child Abduction, 
BRING SEAN HOME FOUNDATION (Apr. 2009), http://bringseanhome.org/resources/ the-left-
behind-parent/the-financial-cost-of-child-abduction/. However, mediation is generally much 
less expensive than litigation. See Matthew Rushton, Counting the Cost of Mediation, JAMS 
INT’L BLOG (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.jamsinternational.com/mediation/counting -cost-
mediation. 
 213.  GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 201, at 20. 
 214.  For instance, some jurisdictions refuse to give legal effect to mediated solutions 
without court approval. Also, legal systems may restrict parents’ ability to limit child 
support payments by agreement. Id. at 22−23. 
 215.  See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS: 
FACTSHEET (citing Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, Grand Chamber judgment of 6 
July 2010, §§ 132−37), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Child_ 
abductions_ENG.pdf (“The child’s interest. . .dictates that the child’s ties with its family 
must be maintained, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit. It 
follows that family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that 
everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, if and when appropriate, to 
‘rebuild’ the family.”) This view does not seem to align with the Japanese cultural view 
that children’s best interests are served by sole custody arrangements, as discussed above. 
 216.  GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 201, at 20. 
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Moreover, to address the enforcement concern, “appropriate procedures 
should be made available to give legal effect to mediated agreements, be 
it by court approval, court registration, or otherwise.”217 
C.  The Proposed International Mediation System as an                          
Effective Mechanism 
In light of these considerations, the proposed solution of international 
mediation must address the disadvantages of mediation, as well as provide 
adequate training, standards, and evaluation of international mediators. In 
the context of a Convention proceeding, the major disadvantages of 
mediation would likely include: (1) the risk of lack of future enforcement of 
mediated solutions; (2) the inconsistency of views regarding the best 
interests of the child; and (3) the unique sensitivity of cases involving 
domestic violence. 
Overcoming the risk of the legal unenforceability of mediated solutions in 
the future is feasible. As previously mentioned, both the party from the 
abducted-to State and the party from State of habitual residence would 
have to stipulate to mediation in the court with jurisdiction over the 
Convention proceedings (i.e., the court of the abducted-to State). Assuming 
the parties reach such a stipulation, the Court would then have authority 
to order them to pursue mediation and be legally bound by its outcome. 
After mediation, the Court of the abducted-to State could adopt the 
mediated solution—drafted by the mediator in the form of a legal 
opinion—as a judicial order. That would ensure the enforceability of the 
mediated solution in that State. 
However, the enforceability of the mediated solution in the State of 
habitual residence may be more problematic. To overcome that concern, 
the court of the returned-to State should have a means of registering a 
judicial order that mirrors the original order in the abducted-to State.218 
 
 217.  Id. at 25. 
 218.  For instance, the UCCJEA, adopted in the U.S., provides for the registration of 
foreign orders. See U.S. COUNTRY PROFILE, supra note 17, at 53. This notion of giving 
“full faith and credit” to judicial orders of other nations may be problematic in some 
situations. For instance, the U.S. would likely be hesitant to give full faith and credit to 
judicial orders of countries that do not share American political, humanitarian, or other 
ideals, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Cuba, or North Korea. However, international 
mediation should help mitigate the concern because the court orders that are ultimately 
adopted will be shaped by neutral mediators who duly consider the interests of U.S. citizen 
children. Furthermore, none of the above-listed countries are parties to the Convention. If 
those countries join in the future, the issue may need to be revisited, but it is currently 
beyond the scope of the Convention. If the issue does arise, the Article 20 exception may 
come into play, allowing refusal of return if the humanitarian and freedom-related 
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As a result, the mediated solution would be legally enforceable in the 
returned-to State as well. The parties would likely comply with the solution 
after the child is returned not only because they could face legal 
consequences, but also because they would have been actively involved 
in the process of creating the solution. Additionally, after recognizing the 
advantages of mediation—particularly the financial cost savings, as 
discussed above—the parties would not likely have any desire to return to 
a formal, adversarial court setting. 
With respect to the other concerns of how to determine the best interests of 
the child and the sensitive nature of domestic violence cases, adequate 
training, selection standards, and evaluation of international mediators can 
largely address those. Because the Convention is explicitly premised on 
furthering the interests of children, that goal should both be emphasized in 
training and be incorporated into the selection process. Mediators who are 
ultimately selected should be committed to seeking solutions that further 
the interests of children worldwide and be knowledgeable of the 
Convention’s other underlying principles. In practice, the mediators should 
not be subject to procedural limitations such as being restricted from 
interviewing the child. Instead, they should have wide latitude to discover 
relevant evidence and subsequently use that information to assist the 
parties in reaching agreements. Additionally, mediators should be regularly 
evaluated by a neutral panel to ensure that their conduct is both effective 
and consistent with the principles of the Convention. The panel performing 
the evaluation should analyze mediators’ records in light of how they have 
considered the interests of children in the past, their ability to maintain a 
neutral perspective, and their overall capacity to lead parties to successful 
agreements. 
The Convention’s objective of furthering the interests of children is 
most critical at this stage because the original judicial decision to return a 
child or to not return a child will often dictate prompt return to the State 
of habitual residence without any significant consideration of what is in 
the child’s best interests. Moreover, States will be more willing to return 
children to their countries of habitual residence if they are assured that the 
children’s best interests will be adequately accounted for in subsequent 
mediation. Thus, international mediation would strengthen compliance 
with the Convention by means of prompt return to the State of habitual 
 
principles of the returned-to State would be inconsistent with return. See Convention, 
supra note 1, at art. 20. 
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residence (including a more proper, narrow application of the “grave risk 
of harm” defense), as well as eliminate nationalistic bias by giving States 
a way to ensure the safety of their citizens through a neutral process. 
The training and selection of mediators can also address the concern 
regarding the unique nature of domestic violence cases. Training programs 
should incorporate extensive teachings about domestic violence and 
emphasize what special attention is required in such cases to reach mediated 
solutions. To improve skill level, candidates with valuable experience in 
domestic violence disputes should have priority over other candidates, and 
experts should have continuous opportunities to contribute knowledge to the 
selected mediators, perhaps at international conferences or lectures. 
The fact that amicable solutions are not always possible is an inevitable 
risk of mediation. Undoubtedly, there will be circumstances in which 
international mediators will be unable to lead the parties to agreeable 
solutions regarding the legal relationships between them after a child’s 
return. Regardless, international mediation will likely strengthen States’ 
compliance with the Convention across the spectrum. Even if all mediations 
do not result in agreement, the mere prospect that many will is sufficient 
to warrant implementation of the system. Parties who do not reach 
mediated agreements will presumably have to resort back to the current 
system of domestic litigation. Seemingly, then, there is nothing to lose. 
1.  Undertakings as a Component of International Mediation 
In response to the unique nature of domestic violence cases, the judicial 
doctrine of “undertakings” is a proposed solution that would “strike a 
balance and ensure the safety of the child and mother” in such 
circumstances.219 Undertakings are defined as “promises, usually by the 
left-behind parent to perform certain obligations and agree to certain 
conditions to facilitate return of the child prior to the time the foreign court 
assumes jurisdiction and can issue an order.”220 For example, in the 
context of domestic abuse, possible undertakings might include a condition 
forbidding contact between the abusive parent and the abducting parent 
effective upon the child’s return or a condition requiring that the abducting 
parent have “exclusive occupancy of the marital home.”221 It seems that 
undertakings would provide relief to Japanese courts seeking to ensure the 
 
 219.  Reynolds, supra note 30, at 390. 
 220.  Linda Silberman, Interpreting the Hague Abduction Convention: In Search of 
a Global Jurisprudence, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 1049, 1076 n.117 (2005). Under international 
mediation, however, the facilitating conditions would ultimately become the order in the 
foreign jurisdiction. 
 221.  Reynolds, supra note 30, at 396. 
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safety of their citizens, while simultaneously allowing courts to render 
decisions consistent with the intent of the Convention. 
The international mediation system could easily incorporate undertakings 
in order to give Member States greater assurance of the safety and 
wellbeing of their citizens and would thereby improve compliance with 
the Convention. The Second Circuit decision in Gaudin v. Remis serves 
as a useful example of the judicial use of undertakings.222 In that case, the 
father brought the children to the U.S. from their State of habitual 
residence in Canada and the mother subsequently petitioned in an American 
court for their return.223 The district court concluded that the Article 13(b) 
“grave risk of harm” defense properly applied.224 However, the Ninth Circuit 
remanded on the ground that “even if such a risk existed, the district court 
erred in failing to consider alternative remedies by means of which the 
children could be transferred back to Canada without risking psychological 
harm.”225 Courts can carefully consider and establish such remedies (i.e., 
judicial undertakings) to ensure the safety of the parties involved. 
If parties could pursue undertakings initially through mediation and 
then have them as adopted as court orders in both applicable States, such 
undertakings would likely be more effective than judicially prescribed 
undertakings. Undoubtedly, each family involved in a Convention return 
proceeding has unique problems and circumstances. Seemingly, then, the 
parties involved in a particular case would be better equipped to craft their 
own undertakings than a judge who is not nearly as familiar with their 
underlying situation. Under the proposed solution, the international 
mediator would fill the shoes of the judge, familiarize his or herself with 
the details of the particular situation, and serve as a neutral third party in 
helping the parties determine which undertakings would best serve the 
interests of the child. 
Another example of an undertaking that could be accomplished through 
international mediation to mitigate the risk of domestic violence is the 
establishment of a probation period in the State of habitual residence 
following the child’s return. During the designated period, social workers or 
law enforcement officers could periodically check on the parties until they 
 
 222.  Gaudin, 415 F.3d at 1032. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. at 1033. 
 225.  Id. at 1035. 
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can determine that the child is safe.226 If the parties agree to such a 
condition via mediation, the court in the abducted-to State could then 
coordinate with authorities in the returned-to State to provide the requisite 
services. 
A court’s return order can encompass undertakings and can lead to 
sanctions if disobeyed. However, such orders are not automatically 
enforceable in the country to which the child is returned.227 In overcoming 
this concern, the most effective solution would be registration of a mirror 
order in the returned-to State, reflecting the mediated agreement originally 
reached and subsequently adopted by the court in the abducted-to State. 
Any conditions would then be legally enforceable in both countries. 
Generally, the use of undertakings is compatible with international mediation. 
Mediators, unlike judges, would be able to approach each situation from 
a neutral point of view, assist the parties in reaching an agreement based 
on extensive familiarity with the case, and ultimately have a means of 
transforming the agreement into a legally binding court order. 
2.  Measures Expanding International Mediator Authority to Secure 
Convention Compliance 
To ensure that international mediators are as effective as possible, the 
proposed system should incorporate certain measures to strengthen their 
authority. First, mediators should undertake the responsibility of drafting 
prospective court orders, which courts should then consider and adopt 
with minimal alteration. Moreover, Member States, through the United 
Nations, should establish an international sanctions committee to deter 
non-compliance with the Convention. 
a.  Mediator-Drafted Opinions Requiring Court Consideration 
International mediators must have substantial authority to direct mediations 
and secure effective outcomes.228 As previously discussed, the first task 
 
 226.  Alternatively, if the prospective abuse was to be targeted only at the mother, 
authorities could investigate that matter as well until they are certain that no abuse is 
occurring in the child’s presence that would pose a “grave risk” of psychological or 
(possibly) physical harm. 
 227.  See Silberman, supra note 220, at 1076 n.117; Patricia M. Hoff, The Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: A Curriculum for 
American Judges and Lawyers, A.B.A., at 101 (Oct. 1997) (explaining that there is no 
legal basis for requiring enforcement in the other country, but that an order may be 
enforced out of comity and will at least be persuasive to the courts of that country). 
 228.  International mediators should have much more authority than domestic family 
law mediators typically possess; otherwise, they will likely be ineffective. For instance, 
mediators generally lack power to decide any issue on the parties’ behalf or to compel 
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of international mediators is assisting the parties in reaching a satisfactory 
solution. Subsequently, mediators should be required to make findings 
and draft an opinion for the court with jurisdiction over the Convention 
proceedings. The opinion should encompass the agreed-upon terms and 
conditions effective after the child returns to his or her State of habitual 
residence. The opinion should also include clear factual and legal 
justifications for each provision. The Court, in turn, should be legally 
obliged to consider the mediator’s drafted opinion. Ideally, the judge 
would adopt the opinion as the order of the court. If the judge has certain 
reservations, he or she could submit a list of suggested revisions, with 
justifications, and request an updated draft. The mediator should make the 
requested changes only if they do not interfere with the intent of the 
Convention. In either situation, the mediator, as opposed to the judge, 
should possess superior control over the content of the order that is 
ultimately adopted. 
This is an ideal scenario for multiple reasons. For one, the mediator 
would likely be more familiar than the judge with the details of the 
particular case. As such, the mediator is in a better position to create a 
legal solution that the parties will comply with and that furthers the 
interests of the particular children involved. As a disinterested party with 
no particular reason to favor one country over another, the mediator would 
also be more neutral than the judge. Thus, the mediator is more likely to 
draft an opinion that is free of nationalistic bias (and hence more credible 
from the perspective of the parties) and consistent with the international 
intent of the Convention.229 
Another important justification for substantial mediator authority is to 
encourage participant cooperation in the mediation process. There will 
undoubtedly be times where one party or the other is not a “bona fide” 
participant in the sense that he or she is insisting on an outcome that is 
inconsistent with the Convention. In such a situation, the mediator should 
be able to make a finding that the party has failed to participate in the 
mediation in good faith. That finding should be incorporated in the drafted 
opinion, and the Court should be required to give it full recognition and order 
the party to comply. The non-compliant party should have an opportunity 
 
their agreement. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 467, 
471 (1991). 
 229.  An incidental benefit of giving international mediators the authority to draft 
opinions is that courts would likely bear significantly less judicial burden. 
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to become a “bona fide” participant by a specified deadline. If the party 
does not do so, the court should resolve the entire Convention dispute against 
the non-compliant party and in favor of the other participant. Courts will 
likely be hesitant to take such action when the non-compliant party is a 
citizen of their State. Thus, it is important to require such action by means of 
a legal provision in the Convention.230 
b.  Establishment of a Sanctions Committee to Deter Non-Compliance 
Mediators must be able to effectively insist on a particular outcome in 
order to fulfill the Convention’s purposes. Courts may be hesitant about 
international mediation and some will likely refuse to comply with the 
mediation process, for example, by refusing to consider a mediator’s 
drafted opinion. Where a court chooses to ignore mediation, there should 
be a means of imposing economic sanctions against the State where that 
court sits. An international sanctions committee at the United Nations 
(“U.N.”) would be an effective arena for such disputes. Such a committee 
could easily take form as a subsection of the U.N. Security Council. 
Indeed, the Security Council has designated more than a dozen sanctions 
committees in the past.231 
Pursuant to Chapter IV of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council may 
use enforcement mechanisms “to maintain or restore international peace 
and security.”232 First and foremost, the Security Council “calls upon the 
parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods 
of adjustment or terms of settlement.”233 If diplomatic efforts fail, the 
Security Council may then use targeted economic sanctions to pressure 
certain States or entities to comply with its objectives.234 The Security 
Council is an appropriate body for applying sanctions internationally 
because of its “universal character.”235 Common examples of sanctions 
historically used include travel bans, arms embargoes, and freezing 
of financial assets.236 In recent years, the Security Council summoned 
independent expert groups to help monitor sanctions and achieve 
 
 230.  Such a legal provision would probably require an amendment to the Convention, 
the implications of which will be discussed below. 
 231.  See U.N. Charter ch. IV, arts. 10−12; UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, 
supra note 40. 
 232.  UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, supra note 40. 
 233.  United Nations Security Council, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sc/. 
 234.  See UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, supra note 40. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  See, e.g., Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 751 (1992) and 
1907 (2009) Concerning Somalia and Eritrea, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/sc/ 
committees/751/. 
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compliance.237 The Secretariat also established a list of expert candidates 
based on specific qualifications for that purpose.238 
If the courts of a particular State wrongfully disregard international 
mediation, the Security Council should call on that State to bring its judiciary 
into compliance. It should recommend specific measures that would help 
the State to effectuate that purpose and attempt to reach a tangible 
agreement (for instance, where the State promises to establish certain 
measures to promote compliance, or to bring its courts into compliance by 
a specific date). If initial efforts fail, the Security Council could draft a 
resolution describing the particular sanction to be enforced, the State or 
States to be targeted, and the “tasks mandated to monitoring mechanisms.”239 
The resolution should incorporate expert recommendations regarding the 
most effective and least oppressive means of securing compliance under 
the circumstances. 
After the Security Council approves the resolution, the targeted State 
should receive notice of the prospective sanction and how to overcome it. 
If the State still refuses to comply, the sanction should take effect and 
monitoring mechanisms should be established and executed with the help 
of independent experts. Ideally, the economic sanction would be 
burdensome enough to secure compliance of the targeted State, but not so 
burdensome that it would engender humanitarian concerns.240 At the point 
of compliance, the sanction would be lifted. Over time, other States would 
likely realize the potential repercussions of non-compliance and develop a 
stronger incentive to ensure judicial cooperation with international 
mediation.241 
 
 237.  See S.C. Res. 997, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/2006/997 (Dec. 22, 2006). 
 238.  Id. ¶ 11. 
 239.  Id. ¶ 32. 
 240.  An example of this view is expressed in the Sean and David Goldman 
International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2014, which explicitly states 
that any actions taken against noncompliant countries may not interfere with humanitarian 
assistance. Sean and David Goldman Act of 2014, supra note 198, at § 202. 
 241.  Alternatively, an entirely new sanctions committee could be created for the 
limited purpose of reviewing Convention disputes. However, the creation of such a 
committee would likely be costly and time-consuming. Since the U.N. Security Council 
has extensive experience with establishing sanctions committees, it appears to be more 
prepared and better qualified to handle the task. 
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3.  UNICEF as an Ideal Body for Selecting International Mediators 
Selecting a list of international mediators is critical to the ultimate 
efficacy of the system. In order to achieve the desired element of neutrality, 
mediators should be selected by an international group. The group should not 
be biased towards any particular country’s cultural perspectives or 
domestic policies. A potential candidate group for selecting international 
mediators is the United Nations Children’s Fund (“UNICEF”). UNICEF 
works in more than 190 countries worldwide to help better children’s lives 
by providing for essential needs such a health care, education, and 
protection from dangerous circumstances.242 It is part of the Global 
Movement for Children,243 and it promotes the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (“CRC”).244 
The CRC is an international treaty that was created in 1989 to promote 
the human rights of minors, including cultural, political, economic, social, 
and civil rights.245 Some of the specific rights guaranteed to children by 
the CRC are the rights to survival, full development, protection from external 
harm, and participation in family life.246 The CRC’s explicit principles 
include: “non-discrimination; devotion to the best interests of the child; 
the right to life, survival and development; and respect for the views of 
the child.”247 Member States to the CRC are obligated to uphold the best 
interests of children in carrying out all domestic policies and actions.248 
UNICEF is an ideal candidate for selecting international mediators 
because its principles are largely intertwined with CRC’s goal to secure 
the best interests of children.249 Because the Convention itself is grounded in 
furthering children’s interests, UNICEF would be well equipped to choose 
mediators in furtherance of that objective. The current problem of 
nationalistic bias would likely disappear in a system where mediators are 
 
 242.  About UNICEF: Who We Are, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/about/who/index_ 
introduction.html (last updated May 23, 2012). 
 243.  The Global Movement for Children is a coalition aiming to better the lives of 
children throughout the world. Id. 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNICEF, http://www. 
unicef.org/crc/index_30177.html; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1980, 
1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448. 
 246.  Rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 245. 
 247.  CRC Turns 20: About the Convention, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/rightsite/ 
237_202.htm; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 245, at arts. 2, 3, 6, 12. 
 248.  CRC Turns 20: About the Convention, supra note 247. 
 249.  See The Convention on the Rights of the Child: About the Convention, UNICEF, 
http://www.unicef.org/rightsite/237_202.htm (“The provisions and principles of the CRC 
guide UNICEF in its mission of advocating for the protection of children’s rights, helping 
children to meet their basic needs and expanding their opportunities to reach their full 
potential”). 
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chosen by representatives concerned primarily with the best interests of 
children. While States have varying interpretations of how to secure such 
interests, the UNICEF approach to achieving that goal would be based on 
neutral principles. In the context of the Article 13(b) defense to returning a 
child, the representatives would likely express concern over matters such as 
what psychological or physical harm the child might suffer as a 
consequence of being returned. However, they would have no inherent 
reason to exhibit partiality toward any particular member State. Hence, 
consideration of such matters would be from a disinterested perspective. 
Moreover, issues that do not truly hinder the interests of children would 
not appeal to the biases of particular decision-makers, such as the 
language the child will grow up speaking, the culture that the child will 
identify with, or the environment in which the child will be raised.250 As 
a result, the potential to corrupt the process would be greatly reduced. The 
ability of courts to consider subjective issues such as a child’s 
prospective political, social, or cultural upbringing in making Convention 
decisions—even when the only justification is a favoring of one’s own 
culture—must be defeated by establishing neutrality at the outset of the 
process. Because promoting the interests of children is consistent with the 
intent of the Convention and circumventing nationalistic bias, UNICEF 
would be an effective selection body. 
A potential concern of giving UNICEF authority to select international 
mediators is the fact that the U.S. has not ratified the CRC.251 The U.S. 
has expressed several reservations to ratifying the CRC. One of the most 
important reservations is the treaty’s advocacy that children and adults 
bear equal rights.252 This may be based on “assumptions that parents will 
be likely to protect children’s best interests, beliefs that parental autonomy, 
will promote healthy diversity, and concerns about the dangers of undue 
state intervention” into the sacred area of family life.253 The CRC grants broad 
 
 250.  That assumes, of course, that neither of the alternative circumstances to which 
the child will be returned is substantially inadequate.  For example, if the child would be 
returned to a dangerous environment, such as a war zone, a mediator would be correct to 
let that influence his or her decision. 
 251.  The United States is the only country other than Somalia that has not ratified 
the CRC. Elizabeth Bartholet, Ratification by the United States of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child: Pros and Cons from a Child’s Rights Perspective, 633 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 80, 80 (2010). 
 252.  See id. at 84−88. 
 253.  Id. at 85. 
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rights of “participation,”254 “provision,”255 and “protection”256 to 
children, but those rights seem to be inconsistent with current U.S. law 
and policy. 
Because UNICEF is a stark promoter of the CRC’s principles,257 the 
U.S. may be hesitant to give UNICEF the authority to select international 
mediators. However, the fact that the U.S. has expressed reservations 
regarding certain aspects of the CRC does not imply that it is inherently 
opposed to furthering children’s interests. In fact, the opposite is true, as 
the U.S. is a strong proponent of the Convention,258 which itself explicitly 
aims to further the interests of children.259 
If the U.S. were to object to UNICEF’s selection authority as inconsistent 
with domestic policy, an alternative solution would be to ratify the CRC. 
In light of the success of international pressure as a means of securing 
Japan’s ratification of the Convention, a similar pattern of international 
pressure would likely achieve the same effect with regard to the U.S. and 
the CRC.260 After a selection group is established, it could then designate a 
smaller body of members to pass on applicants, send out invitations to 
 
 254.  “Participation” encompasses the right of children who are capable of forming 
independent beliefs to express such beliefs freely in all matters impacting them. However, 
U.S. law displays a preference for parents’ rights to make decisions for their children in 
almost all such matters, “even when this raises enormous questions as to whether the 
child’s best interests are served.” Id. at 88−89 (emphasis added). 
 255.  “Provision” incorporates the right of children to receive affirmative assistance 
from the State for purposes of social welfare, health, and education. However, the U.S. 
does not generally recognize the affirmative right of anyone to receive financial assistance from 
the government, instead promoting a tradition of “negative rights,” such as “the individual 
autonomy right to be free from undue intervention by the state.” Id. at 91. 
 256.  “Protection” encompasses the right of children to be free from parental abuse 
and neglect, placing an affirmative obligation on States to protect children within their 
borders from such harm. Although every U.S. state is legislatively required to protect 
children from abuse and neglect, “children have no generally recognized constitutional 
right to such protection, in contrast to the generally recognized constitutional right parents have 
to raise their children free from undue state intervention.” Moreover, states are not 
constitutionally required to protect against maltreatment of children. Id. at 93. 
 257.  See The Convention on the Rights of the Child: About the Convention, supra 
note 249. 
 258.  See 2014 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 24, at 5 (“Since the Convention 
provides the most effective way to facilitate the prompt return of abducted children to their 
country of habitual residence and to help deter abduction, encouraging countries to join 
the Convention is a high priority.”). 
 259.  Convention, supra note 1. As previously noted, the opening sentence provides 
that Member States are “[f]irmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount 
importance in matters relating to their custody.” Id. 
 260.  Another possible solution that would avoid the problem of American hesitance to 
UNICEF as a selection body would be to create an entirely new body of representatives to 
select mediators on behalf of the Convention. However, creating such a body from the 
ground up could be very costly, thus its success is probably more theoretical than practical. 
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potential candidates, and make final selections based on specific criteria 
and qualifications. 
4.  Selection Standards and Training of International Mediators 
Another important issue is how the selection body would determine and 
apply selection criteria. Mediators in the U.S. have several tasks. The Test 
Design Project (“TDP”), an independent group, established a list of 
desired mediator characteristics based on the most common tasks that 
mediators perform in practice.261 Many mediators and other interview 
subjects have offered general endorsements of this list.262 The named 
qualities include: impartiality; effective identification and discovery of 
relevant information; awareness and concern for others’ needs; pursuit of 
collaborative and workable solutions; effectiveness in helping parties 
reach final solutions; effectiveness in managing interactions among the 
parties and dealing with conflicts; and “adequate competence in the issues 
and type of dispute to facilitate communication, help parties develop options, 
and alert parties to relevant legal information.”263 
Additionally, in 1989, the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution 
(“SPIDR”) led an investigation and ultimately handed down recommendations 
regarding mediator qualifications, including that a variety of organizations, 
as opposed to a single entity, establish such qualifications,264 and that 
qualification criteria draw primarily from performance as opposed to paper 
credentials.265 In establishing effective criteria for selecting international 
mediators, the TDP’s list of traits and the SPIDR’s recommendations 
serve as a good foundation. However, similar criteria and recommendations 
endorsed by other signatory nations should also be considered and 
incorporated with the ultimate goal of creating an internationally balanced 
and comprehensive list of mediator qualifications. 
 
 261.  Charles Pou, Jr., Assuring Excellence, or Merely Reassuring? Policy and Practice 
in Promoting Mediator Quality, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 303, 308 (2004). 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Id. at 310. 
 264.  Id. This could be effectuated by having experts from various independent 
groups submit proposed qualifications. The selection body could be required to give due 
consideration to all of the proposals before creating a final list. 
 265.  Id. This recommendation of selecting mediators based on performance as 
opposed to paper credentials could be achieved over time by evaluating international 
mediators based on past performance in Convention disputes. 
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A related issue is how mediators are to be trained after they are selected. 
Appropriate mediator training is critical to any effective mediation system, 
particularly if the system is designed to function on an international 
level.266 Some States already have legislation in place to regulate mediator 
training and qualifications.267 Alternatively, legal systems that do not 
regulate mediator training generally lack a uniform approach to mediator 
training requirements and qualifications.268 
In cases involving international child abduction, the Hague Conference of 
Private International Law (“the Conference”) recommends that mediators 
have substantial experience in family law mediation, undergo additional 
training specifically tailored to international child abduction, and “continu[e] 
training to maintain their professional competence.”269 The Conference 
also encourages States to establish training programs and standards for 
such mediators and to make the names of specialists publicly available 
through family mediator lists.270 Further, States should provide for neutral 
evaluation and monitoring of these mediation services while moving towards 
common standards for evaluation.271 
One organization that already exists to improve the competence of family 
law mediators worldwide is the Academy of Professional Family Meditators 
(“APFM”). APFM’s vision is “[t]o be the premier international organization 
in the development of professional family mediation.”272 To achieve its 
vision, APFM holds annual conferences for mediators,273 offers a variety 
of educational materials,274 and seeks to establish a comprehensive 
 
 266.  See id. at 340. 
 267.  See GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 201, at 36. For example, in France, 
candidates must have professional experience or a national social or health sector diploma 
and must successfully make their way through a selection process. Id. Obtaining the 
diploma requires a heavily regulated curriculum, including 560 hours of law, sociology, and 
psychology training and 70 hours of actual practice. Id. A prospective French mediator 
can also obtain the requisite diploma through professional experience, which entails both 
an assessment by public authorities of the applicant’s admissibility and an assessment by 
an examination panel of “the development of skills [of the applicant] acquired through 
experience.” Id. at 36 n.133. 
 268.  Id. at 36. 
 269.  Id. at 38. 
 270.  Id. at 39. 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  APFM: About Us, ACADEMY OF PROFESSIONAL FAMILY MEDIATORS, http://ap 
fmnet.org/pg7.cfm. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Id. According to APFM’s opening newsletter, “Educational programs and 
opportunities will be provided through pre-conference and conference workshops, partnering 
with colleges, universities, mediation trainers, on-line distance learning, member-
only collegial bulletin boards, webcasts, teleconferences, and a LISTSERV.” Launch of 
the APFM, ACADEMY OF PROFESSIONAL FAMILY MEDIATORS (Mar. 13, 2012), http://apfm 
net.org/pg45.cfm. 
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educational program for family law mediators that will emphasize 
“experience and continuing education requirements.”275 APFM recently 
adopted standards for family law mediators.276 Standard II—competence— 
requires mediators to have specialized training in family mediation and 
the effects of family disputes on parents and children, “including knowledge 
of child development, adult psychopathology, domestic abuse and child 
abuse and neglect.”277 Mediators must also participate in relevant continuing 
education to ensure continuous improvement of their skills and should be 
tested for the competency of their work when possible.278 
In selecting and training international mediators, all of these 
considerations should be taken into account. The selecting body should 
establish uniform criteria for choosing candidates with an emphasis on 
experience in mediating family law disputes. A training program should 
be implemented for selected candidates, focusing primarily on international 
parental child abduction, but also on the specific language, goals, and 
principles of the Convention. Relevant experience is highly desirable, but 
mediators should also be exceptionally familiar with the Convention itself 
so that they can lead families to solutions that are consistent with its 
purposes. Subsequent training programs should be held periodically to 
help mediators maintain their professional competence and adapt to changing 
standards. Experts throughout the world should make appearances at 
trainings in order to present new and valuable information regarding 
international standards of competence, how standards are transforming, 
and how to effectively address such changes. 
Additionally, an organization similar to APFM should be established, 
except, as discussed above, with a more specialized focus on international 
parental child abduction. The new organization should adopt similar 
competency standards requiring mediators to participate in continuing 
education and arrange conferences where mediators can participate in 
workshops and continuously acquire new, relevant information. With a 
greater number of competent family law mediators among the pool 
of candidates, the selected international mediators will likely be more 
 
 275.  Launch of the APFM, supra note 274. 
 276.  APFM Standards of Practice and Training Program Standards, ACADEMY OF 
PROFESSIONAL FAMILY MEDIATORS, http://apfmnet.org/pg38.cfm. 
 277.  Standards of Practice for Professional Mediators, ACADEMY OF PROFESSIONAL 
FAMILY MEDIATORS (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://www.apfmnet.org/docs/Standards%20 
of%20Practice%20Adopted%20at%202-2-14%20Board%20Meeting-Revised%202-20-14.pdf. 
 278.  Id. 
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effective. Moreover, individual Member States should follow the 
Conference’s suggestion and initiate comprehensive training programs 
for family law mediators. Within the U.S., states have their own requirements 
for mediator training279 and continuing mediator education.280 However, 
because such requirements vary among states,281 uniformity is unlikely at 
the national level. The U.S. and other Member States should work 
towards the establishment of nationwide training and continuing education 
programs for mediators in order to facilitate interaction and progress at 
the international level. 
5.  Illustration of the Proposed International Mediation Process 
The following is an illustration of how international mediation would 
function in practice. A man and woman are married in the U.S. and raise 
a child there, thus presumably making the U.S. the child’s State of habitual 
residence. Upon divorce, the parties assume legal joint custody of the 
child, whether by court decree or by the parties’ own out-of-court 
arrangement. The mother then flees the country to take up residence in 
Japan, bringing the child with her in breach of the father’s custody rights 
and thus in violation of the Convention. The father petitions for the child’s 
return in Japan and the mother responds by invoking the Article 13(b) 
defense. Specifically, she alleges that the father suffers from mental illness 
and is too unstable to raise a child. She concludes that sending the child 
back to the U.S. would impose a “grave risk of psychological harm” to 
the child. She also alleges that the father has been physically violent 
 
 279.  For example, in Florida, family mediators must complete one of six family 
mediation training programs approved by the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 
10.100(c) of the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators. How to 
Become a Florida Supreme Court Certified Mediator: Step By Step Guide, FLORIDA 
MEDIATION GROUP (Feb. 16, 2011), available at http://www.floridamediationgroup.com/ 
about/HowToBecomeAMediatorCurrent.pdf. As for New York, it requires mediators to 
undergo forty hours of training and have actual experience mediating cases, while training 
programs must provide experience-based learning opportunities and include a combination of 
“lecture, exercises, small group activities, mediation simulation, and role plays.” Mediation 
Training Curriculum Guidelines, DIVISION OF PROFESSIONAL AND COURT SERVICES, 
OFFICE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/ 
adr/Part146_Curriculum.pdf. 
 280.  In Florida, certified mediators who seek renewal must complete sixteen hours 
of Continuing Mediator Education (“CME”), covering the topics of ethics, domestic 
violence, and diversity or cultural awareness. CME hours may be earned through a wide 
range of methods, including watching or attending a lecture, participating in Internet 
presentations, authoring written work submitted for publication with significant mediation- 
related content, or completing a “self-directed program” approved by a governmental 
licensing board. How to Become a Florida Supreme Court Certified Mediator, supra note 279. 
 281.  See id; Mediation Training Curriculum Guidelines, supra note 279. 
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towards her in the past, but there is no other evidence indicating that he 
ever physically harmed or would likely harm the child. 
The Japanese court would probably be hesitant to send the child back 
to the U.S. because of its desire to protect the mother from potential 
domestic abuse, along with its biases towards maternal custody and 
preserving the child’s national identity.282 However, the parties would 
have the opportunity to stipulate to mediation, choose a mediator from the 
international panel, and reach an out-of-court solution. The mediator 
would, acting as a disinterested party, assist in the negotiation process, 
draft an opinion for judicial consideration, and promote consistency with 
the principles of the Convention. For purposes of neutrality, the mediator 
would not be permitted to have any connection to either State involved in 
the dispute. Furthermore, the mediator would have extensive knowledge, 
skills, and training with respect to international child abduction, thus 
making successful agreement more likely than in domestic family law 
mediation. 
The parties and the agreed-upon mediator would then attend the 
mediation and attempt to negotiate a solution satisfactory to both sides. 
The mediator might lead the parties to an agreement such as: if the mother 
returns to the U.S., the father will move out of the family residence and 
have only limited, supervised visitation with the child. This agreement 
would stand at least until the State of habitual residence is able to investigate 
the matter further and determine whether the father presents an 
endangerment to the child. Alternatively, the father could agree to submit 
to evaluation and treatment by a mental health professional in exchange 
for the mother’s agreement that he can resume normal visitation with the 
child thereafter. 
Finally, the mediator would make findings and draft an opinion reflecting 
the terms and conditions of mediation, which the Japanese court would be 
obliged to consider. The Japanese court would then be able to adopt the 
drafted opinion as a judicial order and the U.S. court would have a means 
of registering a mirror order. Consequently, the parties would be legally 
bound to comply with the mediated agreement in both jurisdictions. Japan 
will not likely object to such an arrangement because it would 
anticipate reaping the benefits of mediation for its own citizens under the 
opposite circumstances—namely, where the U.S. is considering a child’s 
prospective return to his or her habitual residence in Japan. 
 
 282.  See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 382−84, 386−87. 
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6.  Overarching Question: An Amendment to the Convention? 
Presumably, the proposed solution of international mediation would 
require an amendment to the Convention. Article 40 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) covers amendments to 
multilateral treaties.283 Specifically, it requires that all Member States be 
given notice of and have a right to take part in “the decision as to the 
action to be taken in regard to such proposal,” as well as “the negotiation 
and conclusion of any agreement for the amendment of the treaty.”284 Any 
Member State that does not become a party to the amending agreement is not 
bound by that agreement.285 Consequently, before the international 
mediation system can function, every party to the Convention must be 
notified of the proposed amendment and have the opportunity to contribute 
to the shaping of the ultimate provision. The large number of current 
Member States could make this problematic. However, there are reasons 
to presume that most countries would willingly accede to an amendment 
establishing international mediation. 
International mediation would better serve the interests of each country’s 
citizens. Hypothetically, any given country may currently find that 
during a particular period, about half of its Convention proceedings resulted 
in a total win for the resident parent, while the other half resulted in a total 
loss. Under a system of international mediation, this winner-loser 
dynamic would disappear and each case would likely be resolved in a way 
that is at least somewhat satisfactory to the resident parent. If Member States 
could manage to keep an open mind and appreciate the magnitude of this 
benefit, they would not hesitate to agree to the binding amendment. 
Moreover, if certain States were to refuse the proposed amendment, it 
could likely be pursued without them.286 An amendment binding at least 
some of the parties to the Convention would surely be preferable to the 
current system, where every party decides cases according to its own 
standards. Over time, the benefits of the amendment will  begin to 
materialize and hesitant Member States will be encouraged to reevaluate 
 
 283.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 40, May 22, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The U.S. 
and Japan are both VCLT “participants”; the U.S. signed the VCLT on April 24, 1970, 
and Japan acceded to it on July 2, 1981. UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, VIENNA 
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (last updated Sept. 16, 2014), https://treaties. 
un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp 
=mtdsg3&lang=en. 
 284.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 283. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Article 40 of the VCLT, cited above, merely states that parties are not bound by 
an amending agreement if they are not a party to that agreement. It does not prohibit such 
amending agreements or provide that they will render all parties unbound. See id. 
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their cautiousness. Eventually, States will likely follow the lead of the 
amendment’s proponents and accede to the new practice.287 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In light of inconsistent American case law interpreting the Article 13(b) 
“grave risk of harm” exception to returning a child, as well as evidence 
illustrating that Japan may contravene the intent of the Convention, it is 
clear that certain aspects of the Convention require improvement. Currently, 
Member States’ courts may take advantage of the broad language of Article 
13(b) and other exceptions as a means of serving their own citizens’ interests 
and injecting nationalistic bias into their decisions. In particular, for the 
past couple of decades, domestic violence has been a concern that 
American courts have dealt with in different ways and that Japanese courts 
will likely struggle with in the near future. For instance, since 2000, U.S. 
courts have experienced a dramatic shift towards allowing the Article 13(b) 
defense in domestic violence cases, recognizing the importance of evaluating 
the nature of previous abuse and considering whether authorities in the 
State of habitual residence will adequately protect both the children and 
the abused mothers.288 International mediation is an ideal way for the U.S. 
and Japan to conduct such evaluations and establish conditions to ensure 
the safety of the parties involved. Moreover, it would significantly reduce 
judicial burden by delegating to mediators much of the responsibility that 
would otherwise be placed on courts in Convention proceedings. 
Significantly, the impact of international mediation would stretch beyond 
cases involving parties from the U.S. and Japan. Indeed, it would be equally 
as effective in nearly every Convention case involving parties from any 
two Member States. To illustrate, consider the signatories that the U.S. 
State Department’s 2014 report labeled as non-compliant: Costa Rica, 
 
 287.  Generally, if certain States yet to ratify the Convention decided to do so in the 
future, but were hesitant about the international mediation provision, they could express a 
reservation to the treaty with respect to that provision. The VCLT defines reservations and 
explain their parameters. Reservations allow States to effectively exclude the legal effect 
of a specific provision or provisions of a treaty while still becoming a signatory to it. See 
id. arts. 2(1)(d), 19. However, the language of the Convention explicitly states that only 
two specific reservations are allowed, and this would not be one of them. See Convention, 
supra note 1, arts. 24, 26, 42. Hence, expressing a reservation  to the international 
mediation provision would not be an option for future signatories. 
 288.  Morley, supra note 149. 
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Guatemala, and Honduras.289 As for Costa Rica, the U.S. seems to be 
primarily concerned with a 2011 Costa Rican Supreme Court decision, 
which ruled that courts hearing Convention proceedings “should consider 
‘the best interests of the child’ rather than habitual residence” in those 
cases.290 As for Guatemala, the concern—in 2013—related to a more 
general inconsistency in how courts apply the Convention’s principles.291 
For example, a 2012 appellate court decision affirmed a lower court’s 
decision to refuse return on the grounds that “Guatemalan law favors 
maternal custody.”292 With respect to Honduras, “the Honduran judiciary 
continues to treat Hague cases as custody matters.”293 
American unease with regard to these countries probably relates to the 
fact that they are carving out new ways to expand their courts’ subjective 
latitude in making Convention decisions. Under the current precedents, 
Costa Rican judges may rely on subjective justifications drawn from 
domestic law concerning the best interests of children.294 Similarly, 
Guatemalan judges may justify refusal of return on the basis of a purely 
local, cultural perspective that presumes mothers are better suited to the 
task of raising children than fathers.295 Meanwhile, Honduran courts are 
able to resolve Convention cases as custody decisions in contradiction of 
the Convention.296 Clearly, these countries are not only failing to comply 
with the goals and principles of the Convention, but they are injecting 
nationalistic bias. 
Under the proposed solution of international mediation, these concerns 
would be largely eliminated. An international mediator would be far more 
qualified to make a “best interests” determination based on neutral 
principles and a thorough understanding of the circumstances of the case 
than a Costa Rican court with authority to decide what is in the best 
interests of children based on whatever legislation it happens to find 
important at the time.297  Likewise, an international mediator would be able 
to approach the situation from a neutral standpoint, overlook the maternal 
custody presumption, and make a careful determination of the most  
 
 289.  2014 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 24. 
 290.  See id. In June 2013, a Costa Rican court decided a return case under similar 
reasoning.  Id. 
 291.  See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: BUREAU OF CONSULATE AFFAIRS, REPORT ON 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
CHILD ABDUCTION (2013), http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/compliance 
Reports/2013.pdf [hereinafter 2013 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE]. 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  2014 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 24. 
 294.  See id. 
 295.  See 2013 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 291. 
 296.  See 2014 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 24. 
 297.  See id. 
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preferable post-return arrangements for the parties, where a Guatemalan 
court would likely circumvent the Convention’s intent on the basis of a 
narrow, biased perspective.298 Moreover, unlike Honduran courts, which 
have wrongfully assumed authority to make custody determinations 
in Convention proceedings, international mediators would help resolve 
cases in accordance with the Convention by taking the power to determine 
such issues away from courts not located in the State of habitual residence.299 
Under the current domestic resolution of Convention disputes, courts 
must choose winners and losers.300 With the option of international 
mediation, courts would be more inclined to return children to their States of 
habitual residence promptly because those courts would be assured of 
their citizens’ safety abroad. Such safety could be satisfied through a wide 
range of mediated agreements. Successful implementation of international 
mediation in Hague Abduction Convention proceedings would thus 
significantly improve compliance, replacing the current “black or white” 
judicial approach with a more flexible, opportunistic system in which any 












 298.  See 2013 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 291. 
 299.  See 2014 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 24. 
 300.  See, e.g., Roosa, 1991 WL 204483, at *6 (ordering child’s return to his habitual 
residence in Spain because the mother’s allegations of the father’s hostile and controlling 
behavior were insufficient to establish the “grave risk” of harm required by the Convention). 
Obviously, judges making decisions pursuant to the Convention must either order or refuse 
to order the child’s return to his or her State of habitual residence. As a result, one parent 
“wins” in a sense, while the other “loses.” Consider the hypothetical discussed above wherein 
an American child is taken to Japan by his mother in breach of his U.S. citizen father’s 
custody rights. If the father petitions in Japan for the child’s return and the Japanese court 
ultimately decides that the Article 13(b) defense applies, the father will not return to 
America with his child. At the same time, the child’s mother, who presumably took the child 
to Japan intentionally, is permitted to remain there with the child. 
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